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A bstract

A n Overview o f Local, State and Federal Regulations Imposed Upon
Political Advertising discusses the 1991 policy revisions enacted by the Federal
Communications Commission that effect political advertising.

In addition,

considerable attention is devoted to how the judicial system has treated cases
dealing w ith a variety of political advertising issues ranging from the posting
of campaign signs to assuring that proper sponsorship identification appears on
campaign materials.
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C H A PTER 1

In t r o d u c t i o n

W hat a difference a hundred years make, for, in just a little over a
century, the essence of political advertising has evolved from campaign speeches
on tree stumps to the sophisticated media-dominated political advertising to
which we are so accustomed today.
The presidential election of 1840, which pitted M artin Van Buren against
William H enry Harrison, was significant in that it marked the first campaign
that showcased the use of "image” advertising (Jamieson 1992). The intent of
image advertising is to link popular symbols—such as the Constitution, bald
eagle, or Lady Liberty—to the candidate (Jamieson 1992). Harrison successfully
associated himself with a log cabin and hard cider, which had the effect of
transforming the son of a wealthy governor into a modest, hardworking farmer
and backwoodsman Qamieson 1992).
The most common form of political advertising during the 1840 election
was “word-of-mouth.” A nother important contribution that arose out of that
political contest was the use of the direct appeal (Jamieson 1992).
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The direct appeal allowed the candidate the opportunity to speak publicly on
his own behalf and in his own defense (Jamieson 1992). But, these refutations
of the candidate’s character were limited, as it was not until 1912 that the
presidential candidate was accepted as an active campaigner and an advocate of
his own cause Qamieson 1992). Prior to 1912, the traditional campaign protocol
was for the candidate to deliver a speech of thanks after being notified of the
party’s nomination. Aside from writing a letter stipulating the precise aspects
of the party platform on which he would run, the candidate was silent until the
election results were announced (Jamieson 1992).
While William Jennings Bryan pioneered the modern campaign in 1896
by giving several impassioned speeches across the country advocating his
candidacy, it was not until 1928 that a revolution occurred in the realm of
political communication: The creation of a national audience via the radio
(Jamieson 1992). The radio offered candidates the ability both to speak to huge
audiences and to position political messages into specific time boundaries
(Jamieson 1992). Because it was essentially impossible to measure the impact of
a given message on an invisible audience, campaigns began to rely on the use of
polls conducted to chart audience predispositions and responses (Jamieson 1992).
The duration of the political speech witnessed a dramatic decline, since
candidates were charged the standard commercial rates for radio air time
(Jamieson 1992). In 1928, the average amount of time purchased by candidates

was one hour, as opposed to 1980 when the typical message ran only thirty
seconds Qamieson 1992).
Newsreels emerged side by side with radio Qamieson 1992). In fact, the
newsreel was, in many respects, the predecessor of today’s televised political
advertisement Qamieson 1992). The newsreel technology made it possible for
partisan films to be distributed through the established newsreel channels
Qamieson 1992). In 1948, Truman’s documentary newsreel may have proven
to be the difference in his ultimate narrow victory over Dewey Qamieson 1992).
Trum an’s film, which ran the last week before the election, was created in
response to

Dewey’s professionally-prepared newsreel Qamieson

1992).

Trum an’s film, unlike Dewey’s, maintained a newsreel-like feel to which theatre
goers were accustomed, perhaps making it more credible and, therefore, more
effective Qamieson 1992).
The partisan newsreel was estimated to reach a weekly audience of 65
million in 1948 via the nation’s 20,000 theatres Qamieson 1992). The audience
was considered a captive one since the theatre attendees paid money to see the
feature presentation. Therefore, they had a self-interest in staying in the theatre
throughout the presentation of whatever the theatre offered Qamieson 1992).
Further, the newsreel was also able to reach voters of all political persuasions
Qamieson 1992).
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The election of 1948 was also noteworthy in that it was the first in
which presidential candidates purchased television time in order to influence
voters (Jamieson 1992). It was, however, in 1951 that coast-to-coast television
became a reality, thus making massive viewing audiences available to political
campaigns outside the confines of the movie theatre (Jamieson 1992).
While televised political advertisements continue today to be one of the
most effective campaign tools, astounding technology is on the horizon that will
have an enormous impact on the future of political advertising. The use of the
video cassette, for instance, is becoming very prevalent in helping candidates get
their political messages out in a precisely targeted manner. New methods of
voter targeting track whether households have at least one video cassette
recorder (VCR). Campaigns can then send such households cassette duplications
of campaign-produced commercials that can be specifically aimed at the
particular voter. Using voter-specific video cassette distribution, campaigns can
be spared the necessity of having to purchase costly television air time. To
create effective levels of recognition for a candidate, a given televised spot has
to be seen at least three times and, to ensure that the spot is viewed that many
times by any particular voter, a substantial media buy is required on several
different television channels simultaneously.
The use of video cassettes is advantageous because they are extremely cost
effective when they are dubbed (copied) in mass quantities, especially in

comparison to television rates. Additionally, the video cassette recipient has the
opportunity to view the message at his leisure. Also, since the viewer has made
the conscious choice to watch the video cassette, he or she is much more likely
to give it greater attention. Above all, the candidate knows, as with his direct
mail literature, his message is being received in exactly the place he wants it to
go—where it can be most effective—and is being seen by whom he wishes it to
be seen.
The emerging VCR campaign technology is just one example.

The

possibilities that personal computers offer to the political campaign, as another
example, are just beginning to be tapped. W ith on-line user services composed
of millions of subscribers, the opportunities for candidates to have their political
messages available on computer services nationwide are indeed a reality.
While the development of new technology that will surely change the
means of political communication is exciting to watch as it unfolds, the scope
of this paper will concentrate instead on the more “traditional” print and
broadcast media and the roles they play in the realm of political advertising.

6
A D i s t in c t io n B e t w e e n B r o a d c a s t

and

P r i n t M e d ia

Congress and the courts have treated the broadcast and print media
differently. In contrast to newspaper publishing, the operations of a broadcaster
have always been subject to elaborate governmental control (Dorsen 1976). The
apparent rationale for allowing such stringent governmental regulation is that
broadcast frequencies are a public resource. The ability to use the airwaves is
limited by the fact that there are a limited number of frequencies to be had
(Dorsen 1976). The concept that the airwaves are not available to everyone was
coined the "scarcity theory” by the Supreme Court in the 1943 case of National
Broadcasting Co. v. U.S. (Dorsen 1976). The notion of the scarcity theory has
allowed the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) not only to deal with
the technical and engineering impediments influencing the effective use of the
broadcast media, but it has also enabled the FCC to establish a regulatory
scheme to ensure that aired broadcasts conform with “public interest, conve
nience or necessity” (Dorsen 1976).

T h e F ir s t A m e n d m e n t

a n d the

A bility

to

Regulate

While this paper will spend some time discussing the current policies of
the FCC as they relate to political advertising, it will also analyze the judicial
treatment that many political advertising regulations have received inside
courtrooms across America.

Some of these cases deal directly with FCC
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policies, while many others arose as challenges to local and state ordinances in
their attempts to regulate political speech.
Because the right to political speech is one that is protected under the
umbrella of the First Amendment, the judicial system strictly scrutinizes any
attempts to restrict it. In general, however, it appears that if the presiding court
finds that a legitimate governmental interest is served by the regulation, then it
will be allowed to stand. A Harvard Law Review article, “Developments in the
Law—Elections,” perhaps best summarizes the essence of governmental
regulations in the forum of the electoral process:
No institution is more central to the United States’ system of representa
tive democracy than the election. Americans have continually relied on
elections to implement the fundamental principle that all sovereignty
rests in the governed. That almost half of the amendments to the
Constitution adopted since 1791 have concerned the franchise and
election procedure highlights the importance of the electoral process. In
order for elections of public officials (and public referendums) to take
place, some State regulation is necessary. All States extensively regulate
a variety of aspects of the electoral process. Laws have been enacted
regulating campaign financing and spending, campaign speech, and
various kinds of unscrupulous campaign practices. Many election
regulations are highly controversial, for considerable disagreement exists
as to both the propriety of the States’ assuming any role in these areas,
and the wisdom of specific laws. Moreover, many election laws raise
serious constitutional questions. Although the power of the State to
regulate elections is beyond dispute, that power must be exercised within
the limits imposed by the Constitution (as noted in Kansas v. Davis
1991).
It is not the intent of this paper to examine every conceivable form of
regulation imposed upon political advertising. Instead, it should serve as more

of an introductory overview of some of the various types of regulations that
exist.

The information presented herein is intended to serve as a sort of

reference source for candidates, campaign staffs, political aficionados, and
perhaps, in a much more limited context, lawmakers as they attempt to discern
how and what types of regulations are permissible when dealing within the
“sacred political arena.”

CHAPTER 2

T h e P o l ic ie s

of the

FC C

Clearly, the entire realm of politics has come a long way from the days
when Lincoln and Douglas participated in numerous multiple-hour debates
before groups of concerned voters. Today, most of the information that voters
receive about the individuals seeking office is contained in brief evening news
“sound bites,” or in campaign-produced thirty-second radio and television
commercials, or “spots.” Because our society is so media-oriented, it has put
increased emphasis on a campaign speech writer to fill the candidate’s
presentation with as many usable sound bites as possible to increase the odds
of the media actually using at least one of the sound bites, the better to get the
candidate’s precise message across to the voting public.

In the area of paid

political advertising, a campaign’s media consultants bear the burden of targeting
demographics and producing “compelling” spots that will get their candidate
favorably noticed.
Media consultants do not have complete autonomy when it comes to
crafting political advertisements. The Federal Communications Commission has
an array of specific guidelines that must be adhered to by both the campaign
and the broadcasting stations. As recently as December 1991, several changes
9
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were enacted in the FC C ’s political programming policies. This chapter will
address the new FCC policies, some of the congressional enactments that led up
to this sweeping change, and the effectiveness the F C C ’s reforms.
After experiencing the political battles of the 1988 presidential election,
political pundits surmised that the public’s low expectations of public officials
had prompted reform (“Talking Heads” 7). Several political advertising and
accountability reform bills were proposed in the Congress in 1990. Senator Bob
Graham and Representative Ed Markey co-sponsored a bill intended to
institutionalize presidential debates (“Talking Heads” 8). Their idea was to
require all presidential candidates using public financing to participate in at least
four 90-minute debates, each debate to include 30 minutes of the individual
candidates directly addressing the viewing audience (“Talking Heads” 8).
Graham and Markey also sought to use the Public Broadcasting Service to allow
for 15 prime-time minutes once or twice a week for the candidates to address
the nation (“Talking Heads” 8).
A nother series of reforms was proposed by Senators Warren Rudman and
Daniel Inouye. They sponsored a bill that would require campaign commercials
to consist only of the candidate talking to the viewers without elaborate
graphics or voice-overs—the so-called “talking head” (“Talking Heads” 8). While
this particular version may, in fact, violate the freedom of expression component
of the First Amendment, there are other possibilities that could prove to be
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acceptable. O ne alternative would be to make the “talking head” requirement
voluntary and provide free television air time for those who comply (“Talking
Heads” 8). Candidates could be given vouchers to spend at any television or
radio station, enabling them to target the precise audiences that would be of
help to them in terms of votes (“Talking Heads” 8). If the station, as a whole,
were to exceed its ceiling time allotment, the government could reimburse the
station for the additional time at standard advertising rates with money raised
by the voluntary presidential campaign contribution box found on Federal
income tax returns (“Talking Heads” 8). It is believed that such a plan could
reduce the influence of powerful political action committees (PACs) (“Talking
Heads” 8).
Essentially, the basis of a reform proposal like this is to give candidates
large amounts of “free” television and radio time for voluntary spending
limitations and for voluntary compliance with the “talking heads” rule (“Talking
Heads” 8). While it is acknowledged that the “talking heads” rule would not
mean the end of negative televised ads, it would be a step in a more positive
direction.
The tw o congressional enactments that eventually provided the impetus
for the FC C ’s policy reforms came in the form of bills S. 3 and H.R. 3750.
Senate Campaign Reform Bill S. 3 was authored by Senator David Boren and
it passed the senate in May of 1991 by a 56-to-42 margin (Sukow 35). The

legislation requires that broadcasters sell all eligible candidates advertising time
at their “lowest unit rate” on a non-preemptible basis (Sukow 35). The bill also
sets voluntary spending limits for senatorial candidates only, and those senate
campaigns that remain below the established limits between the primary and
general elections would be eligible for a further 50% discount off the lowest unit
rate (Sukow 35).

Additionally, S. 3 creates a government-funded voucher

program to lessen the costs for large blocks of political advertising, such as
longer format spots that run from one to five minutes each (Sukow 35).
Senator John Danforth amended S. 3 to allow for preemptions of spots
until they are paid in full (Sukow 35). The amendment also made it very clear
that broadcasters will not be penalized if a spot is preempted by circumstances
beyond the station’s control, such as late-breaking news (Sukow 35). Addition
ally, limitations were placed on the period in which candidates would be eligible
for the lowest unit rate: 30 days before the primary and 45 days before the
general election, w ith the exception of those candidates eligible for the extra
50% discount (Sukow 35).
The House Campaign Spending Limit and Election Reform Act (H.R.
3750) was sponsored by Representative Sam Gejdenson (Sukow 35). The bill
contained the lowest unit rate aspects of the D anforth amendment, but without
providing for the 50% discount for either House or Senate members (Sukow 35).
This bill was not w ithout its critics from within the broadcasting industry. In

fact, it was several months after the hearings commenced on the initiative that
the broadcasting trade group, the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB),
agreed to support the passage of a policy that would guarantee political
candidates that their commercials would air when scheduled at the lowest unit
rate and that these lowest rates would be available 30 days prior to the primaries
and 45 days prior to the general elections (“National Association” 51).
W ith the support of the broadcasters, the Federal Communications
Commission ultimately adopted these reforms in the Commission’s political
programming policies on December 12, 1991 (FCC 91-403, 1). There were four
major components to the reform: Reasonable access, equal opportunities, lowestunit-charge, and political file requirements (FCC 91-403, 1).

R e a s o n a b l e A c c e ss

Reasonable access is a term that applies solely to candidates running for
Federal offices (FCC 91-403, 6). It requires stations to use reasonable, good faith
judgement in providing equal access to broadcasting media sources (FCC 91-403,
8). There is no formal mechanism to determine exactly what reasonable access
would entail. The Commission will look at the particular issues in a given case
to determine if reasonable access had or had not been afforded (FCC 91-403, 8).
While FCC licensees can forbid the sale of time for political advertise
ments during news broadcasts, there are a few guidelines to which stations must
adhere in the area of reasonable access (FCC 91-403, 9). Reasonable access must
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be provided at least 45 days before a primary and 60 days before either a general
or special election (FCC 91-403, 9). Commercial and noncommercial stations
alike must make program time available to Federal candidates during prime time
and other periods unless circumstances exist that make it reasonable to deny
access (FCC 91-403, 9). If a commercial station chooses to donate rather than
sell advertising time to candidates, then it must make time of the same various
lengths that it allows for commercial advertisers available free of charge to the
Federal candidates (FCC 91-403, 9). Further, a station may not use a denial of
reasonable access as a way to censor or exert control over the content of
political material (FCC 91-403, 10). However, stations can take into account
their programming and business commitments, including the numbers of
candidates running in a particular race, the program disruption that would be
caused by the political advertising, and the amount of time already sold to a
candidate when they decide whether or not to afford the candidate reasonable
access (FCC 91-403, 10).
The reasonable access provision does not apply to non-Federal candidates.
In addressing this issue, the Commission decided to stand by its existing policy
of not allowing a “specific right of access” to state and local candidates (FCC 91403,11). Section 312(a)(7) of the political broadcasting laws explicitly states that
the reasonable access provision creates a right of reasonable access exclusively
for Federal candidates (FCC 91-403, 11). Even the Supreme Court, in the case
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of CBS, Inc. v. FCC, stated that, under the “public interest” standard, “an
individual [non-Federal] candidate can claim no personal right of access” (FCC
91-403, 11). Stations may satisfy any public interest obligation with regard to
state and local elections through the areas of news and public affairs program
ming (FCC 91403, 11).
Overall, the real basis of the reasonable access provision is to require
stations to allow Federal candidates reasonable access to a station’s facilities.
Also, it is to allow the Federal candidates to purchase what are considered
“reasonable amounts of time” (FCC 91403, 6).

E q u a l O p p o r t u n it ie s

The second major component of the FC C ’s reforms is that of equal
opportunities. This requires that stations which allow Federal, state, or local
candidates to “use” the station must provide equal opportunities to all other
candidates running for the same office to likewise “use” the station (FCC 91403,
14). Bona fide newscasts, as well as news interviews, documentaries, and news
events, are all exempt from this requirement (FCC 91403, 15). A bona fide
newscast is one deemed to report upon news of some area of current events in
a manner similar to more traditional newscasts (FCC 91403, 15). Licensees are
expected to exercise control over the newscast by exercising their editorial
discretion as to whether or not to air a program that may constitute a candidate
“use” (FCC 91403, 16).
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A “use” means an appearance by the candidate by voice or picture in
which the candidate is identifiable to the audience (FCC 91-403, 17). It includes
only nonexempt candidate appearances that are controlled, approved, or
sponsored by the candidate (or the candidate’s recognized committee) after the
time when the candidate becomes a legally qualified candidate (FCC 91-403, 17).
If a legally qualified candidate does not voluntarily appear in a nonexempt
broadcast, such as unauthorized, independently-sponsored advertisements or
rebroadcasts of appearances made prior to the particular candidate attaining the
status of a legally qualified candidate, his appearance would not constitute a
“use” (FCC 91-403, 18). Essentially, the definition of “use” depends solely on
whether a given appearance was voluntary (under the candidate’s control) after
the candidate had become a legally qualified candidate.
In the area of sponsorship identification guidelines, the FCC has required
additional actions to ensure that sponsor information is more available to the
public (FCC 91-403, 21). Stations must keep lists of information for inspection
by the public pertaining to a political sponsor’s identity (FCC 91-403, 21).
Announcements of sponsorship in those advertisements that run for five
minutes or more are to be made at both the beginning and at the end of the
advertisement (FCC 91-403, 21). Political advertisements carried by television
stations are required to have both audio and video identification (FCC 91403,
23). The minimum video identification of the sponsor is to appear with letters
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equal to or greater than 4% of the picture height, and the identification must
appear on the screen for no less than ten continuous seconds (FCC 91-403, 24).
A reasonable standard basis is to be used by the licensees to assure that
the size and timing requirements are being met (FCC 91-403, 24).
The “liability for incorrect sponsorship identification rests with licensees”
(FCC 91-403, 21). In this light, stations may require that political advertise
ments contain the appropriate sponsorship announcements (FCC 91-403, 21).
This is an exception to the no-censorship rule described earlier.

When

identifying the appropriate sponsor of the political material, licensees need only
exercise reasonable care (FCC 91-403, 21).
The FCC does not require candidates to submit their advertisements to
the station prior to being aired so that the station might determine whether the
advertisement complies with the sponsorship identification rules (FCC 91-403,
23). Instead, the FCC adheres to a policy of permitting broadcasters to request
a pre-airing submission of the advertisement to determine if it meets with both
technical and sponsorship requirements (FCC 91-403, 24). There are occasions,
however, when the candidate refuses to allow the advertisement to be
pre-screened, or when there is insufficient time to review an advertisement that
should be run without delay (FCC 91-403, 24). In such cases, the station can
presume that the advertisement complies with the established requirements and
they may run it the first time w ithout fear of FCC sanctions (FCC 91-403, 24).

If it is discovered that the proper identification is lacking, then it is the station’s
responsibility to add or modify the message of sponsorship to bring it into
compliance (FCC 91-403, 24).

Lowest-unit -charge
The third major area of reform involves that of the “lowest-unit-charge.”
The concept of providing for the lowest-unit-charge came about in 1972 when
Congress added Section 315(b) to the Communications Act (FCC 91-403, 24).
The Section directs broadcast and cable stations to charge political candidates the
“lowest-unit-charge of the station” for the same class, time period, and amount
of time as a station’s “most-favored advertiser” during a window of time that is
to run from 45 days prior to a primary election and 60 days prior to a general
election (FCC 91-403, 24). Congress’ expressed intent was “to give candidates
for public office greater access to the media and . . . to halt the spiraling costs
of campaigning for public office” (FCC 91-403, 24). Congress wanted stations
to place candidates in the same class as a broadcaster’s “most-favored advertiser”
(FCC 91403, 24).
The broadcaster is responsible for informing the candidates about the
lowest-unit-charge. A particular candidate’s lack of knowledge about the lower
rates does not alleviate the broadcaster’s obligation to offer the candidate this
reduced rate (FCC 91403, 26). The station is required to disclose information
to candidates regarding the description and definition of each class available to
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commercial advertisers, and that such information be complete enough to allow
candidates to identify and understand what specific attributes differentiate each
class (FCC 91-403, 26). A complete description of the lowest-unit-charge and
related privileges—such as priorities against preemption and “make-goods” prior
to specific deadlines—for each class of time offered to commercial advertisers
must also be provided to candidates (FCC 91-403, 27). Also, a description of
the method a station uses to sell preemptible time—as well as the likelihood of
preemption for each kind of preemptible time—must be disclosed (FCC 91-403,
27). Finally, the station must inform the candidate about how its sales practices
are conducted w ith regard to audience delivery impacts (FCC 91-403, 27). Once
complete disclosure is made, stations must negotiate in good faith to sell time
to candidates in accordance with this disclosure (FCC 91-403, 27).
There are two primary categories or classes of time: preemptible and nonpreemptible time. Preemptible time, as its name implies, consists of flexible
time slots that can be preempted from airing at a particular time by the
broadcaster (FCC 91-403, 30).

There are also several different forms of

preemptible time, ranging from immediately preemptible, where the spot can
be rescheduled indefinitely or until another time, to preemptible with notice,
where the station must give prior notice to the individual if the spot is to be cut
(FCC 91-403, 30). A class such as preemptible with notice is generally more
expensive than one that is immediately preemptible because of the additional
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notification provided to the client so that alternate arrangements can be made
quickly. However, all of the different classifications of preemptible time still
must be offered to the candidate at the lowest-unit-charge (FCC 91-403, 30).
Non-preemptible classes of time are even more costly than preemptible
time because of the fact that spots in this time class cannot be deleted from their
scheduled airing (FCC 91-403, 30). Non-preemptible time is usually sold for a
particular range of time during which the spot will air. This range of time
could consist of the spot airing during a certain program, or at a specific time
of the day (FCC 91-403, 30).
Yet another classification that is closely related to non-preemptible time
is fixed-position time. Fixed-position is the most costly of the three classes
because a fixed-position spot is guaranteed to air at the time denoted (FCC 91403, 30). If the spot is scheduled to appear at 8:15 p.m. on August 31st, then
that is precisely when the station must air this spot.
U nder the lowest-unit-charge rule, the creation of special, “premiumpriced” classes of time sold to candidates is prohibited (FCC 91-403, 35).
Stations may sell the costly fixed-position or non-preemptible time to candidates
if such a higher-priced class of time is made available to both candidates and
commercial advertisers alike, and that no lower-priced class of time—such as
preemptible—is, in a functional sense, equivalent to the non-preemptible class
(FCC 91403, 36).
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Stations are allowed to calculate the lowest-unit-charge on a weekly basis
in conjunction with the sale of weekly rotations (FCC 91-403, 37). Stations
must verify that the lowest-unit-charge is the lowest price paid by any advertiser
during a given period in a certain week.

This includes those commercial

advertisers or other political candidates whose spots appeared in that particular
week, but who may have standing contracts with the station that are in effect
over the course of several weekly rotations (FCC 91-403, 37).
Distinctly different rotations constitute separate periods of time for the
purposes of calculating the lowest-unit-charge, regardless of whether or not they
overlap with one another (FCC 91-403, 38). Distinctly different rotations are
rotations that have “meaningful differences in value” to an advertiser (FCC 91403, 38). For example, a radio morning-drive time rotation of 6:00 a.m. to
9:00 a.m. is a distinctly different rotation from a 6:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. rotation
due to the possibility that the advertiser’s spot could run in the less valuable
10:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. time period.
N o rate increases are allowed during the campaign period except in those
circumstances where changes in “ordinary business practices” dictate such
alterations (FCC 91-403, 39).

Such circumstances could include changes in

audience ratings, seasonal program changes, and rate changes that occur on a
weekly basis at those stations that sell time on a weekly basis (FCC 91-403, 39).
Candidates who sign a contract with the station to purchase time after the
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effective date of such a rate increase are entitled to the lower rates charged to
other advertisers, whether they are commercial or political, who contracted for
time prior to the rate increase, provided that the spots are of the same class and
length (FCC 91-403, 39).
“Fire sale” time availabilities are those sold at the last minute when it is
determined that there is available time inventory (FCC 91-403, 44). Stations are
to treat fire sales as affecting all classes of time, but only during the particular
time period in which fire sale spots are broadcast (FCC 91-403, 44). The fire
sale rate must be made available to all candidates and the availability of the fire
sale time also must be fully disclosed (FCC 61-403, 45).
A “make-good” refers to those situations when an advertisement is
preempted and the station is forced to find a new availability in which to
reschedule the advertisement (FCC 91-403, 45). A station is required to offer
make-goods to candidates if make-goods are also offered to the station’s
commercial advertisers who have purchased time in the same class (FCC 91-403,
45). Make-goods for political spots must air before the election and “where the
licensee would so treat its most-favored commercial advertiser where time is of
the essence” (FCC 91-403, 46).
Stations are required to include make-goods in lowest-unit-charge
calculations (FCC 91403, 47). When determining the lowest-unit-charge for a
particular class of time, a broadcaster must include the rate paid by an advertiser
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whose spot was “made good” during that same period (FCC 91-403, 48). Where
a station places a make-good in a more valuable program or time of day, the
value of that make-good must be factored into the calculation of the lowest-unitcharge for that more valuable time slot (FCC 91-403, 48).

Candidates who

purchase a more expensive spot than the one in which the station provides the
make-good are entitled to a rebate of the difference between the rate they paid
and the rate of the make-good spot (FCC 91-403, 48). If a candidate’s promised
audience delivery falls below the anticipated level, then the candidate is to be
given an additional make-good or a bonus spot in the same manner as would be
offered to commercial advertisers (FCC 91-403, 48).
The FC C ’s lowest-unit-charge sold-out policy states that a station may
not inform candidates that the preemptible time is sold out in order to leave
them no choice but to purchase non-preemptible spots during the same program
or time period (FCC 91-403, 49). There is no requirement that a station is to
sell time during a given program, but once a station decides to sell time within
a given period, it cannot inflate the price of a spot sold to a candidate beyond
the minimum necessary by stating that all the preemptible time is sold out
(FCC 91-403, 49).

P o lit ic a l F ile Requirem ents
The final area of reform addressed by the FC C is in the area of station
political file requirements (FCC 91-403, 49). The FCC requires that a station
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maintain neat and accurate political files so that anyone viewing the files can
easily determine what the station has sold or provided to each and every
candidate (FCC 91-403, 50). Station files are to include information showing the
schedule of the time provided or purchased, when the spots actually aired, the
rates charged, and the classes of time purchased (FCC 91403, 51).

This

information is necessary to determine whether a station is providing candidates
with equal opportunities and whether they are receiving favorable or unfavor
able treatment in the placement of spots (FCC 91403, 51). Such treatment is
especially important when one considers the fact that most stations offer widely
varying rotations (FCC 91403, 51).

R ea ctio n s t o t h e FCC P o lic y C hanges
As one can easily see, the changes made by the FC C in the area of
political programming reforms are quite vast. Because of this, it was probably
of no great shock when im portant judicial questions began emerging even before
the F C C ’s proposed policy revisions were down on paper. In October of 1991,
a state court in Alabama ruled that political candidates should be permitted to
take broadcasters to court for alleged overcharges for political commercials (“An
Alabama” 12). The broadcasters, in their losing effort, had argued that it should
be the FCC who decides whether or how much overcharging had occurred (“An
Alabama” 12).
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The FCC responded to the legal predicament by asserting total
jurisdiction over enforcement of the lowest-unit-charge law (Jessell 34). This
stand taken by the FCC had the effect of preempting lawsuits filed against
stations by political candidates claiming to have been overcharged for airing
their spots (Jessell 34). Due to the number of lawsuits filed in state courts as a
result of the Alabama decision, the National Association of Broadcasters lobbied
extensively to convince the FCC to assert jurisdiction in determining the lowestunit-charge rate liability and remedies (Jessell 34).

Additionally, the FCC

decided to include complaint procedures that would allow for a discovery
process that would be similar to what would be expected in a court of law
(Jessell 34).
As one might expect, the political complaints came in large numbers. It
is interesting to note the types of complaints rejected by the FCC. A complaint
filed by Democratic congressional candidate Tom Laughlin alleged that the
reasonable access provision was denied him when a television station in New
Hampshire rescheduled an hour-long segment that Laughlin had purchased to
immediately follow a debate in which he took part (“FCC Turns” 6). Further,
the station required Laughlin to submit a video tape of his hour-long show,
refusing to allow him to broadcast live (“FC C Turns” 6). In its decision, the
FCC agreed that he had the right to broadcast live, but that there was no
definitive evidence that the rescheduling was unreasonable (“FCC Turns” 6).
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Democratic congressional candidate Lenora Fulani complained that public
stations WGBH-TV in Boston and WENH-TV in D urham both denied her
equal opportunity after they refused to provide her with two hours of prime
time programming (“FCC Turns” 6). The stations both took this position
partly because she was not included in a debate between five Democratic
candidates that was produced by MacNeil/Lehrer Productions and aired by PBS
(“FCC Turns” 6).

The stations did offer her five minutes of programming

instead of the two hours, and the FCC held that this concession was not
unreasonable and thus denied her complaint (“FCC Turns” 6).
A somewhat related issue involved a law firm that represents the
majority of the political candidates who file complaints against broadcasters for
their alleged violations of the lowest-unit-charge rules (“Barnes, Browning” 56).
The firm of Barnes, Browning, Tanksley and Casurella filed a suit against the
A rbitron rating organization (“Barnes, Browning” 56). The suit alleged a breach
of contract because A rbitron apparently reneged on its agreement to sell its
ratings information to the law firm (“Barnes, Browning” 56). It seems that
A rbitron decided not to sell the ratings information when it learned that the
information would be used to determine whether the stations had overcharged
Barnes, Browning, Tanksley and Casurella’s political clients (“Barnes, Browning”
56). An A rbitron spokesperson stated that the company “does not seek to
profit from selling data that would be used against our customers” (“Barnes,
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Browning” 56).

Bobby Kahn, a partner in the law firm, remarked that

A rbitron’s actions were part of a “conspiracy of the industry as a whole to deny
refunds of overcharges” (“Barnes, Browning” 56). Although a decision in the
case is forthcoming, it is notew orthy that the Superior Court of Fulton County,
Georgia, not the FCC, will be the forum in which the verdict is rendered.
Complaints of a different nature abound regarding the FC C ’s new
policies. Indeed, even months after the comprehensive political broadcasting
rules were adopted, groups of broadcasters, politicians, and citizens demanded
still more reforms (Flint 50). In the area of audio sponsorship, many claim that
the requirement falls under the category of “forced political speech,” which
would naturally abridge the First Amendment, because at least 20% of a thirtysecond campaign commercial would be filled by the audio identification
requirement (Flint 50).

This, advocates claim, would “unreasonably and

unconstitutionally” limit political speech (Flint 50). Candidates are now only
able to purchase twenty-four seconds rather than thirty seconds at the lowestunit-charge, which would seemingly deprive the candidates of their benefit
granted by Congress (Flint 50). Such a policy, according to the Republican
National Committee, defeats the purpose of the lowest unit rate when
candidates pay for a thirty-second spot, of which six seconds are not available
for use (Flint 50). W ith the continuation of this requirement, it appears that
ten-second and fifteen-second spots would be virtually eliminated (Flint 50).
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A group known as the Media Access Project is upset at the FC C ’s
definition of just what constitutes a “use” (Flint 50). In the past, the FCC
defined a “use” to consist of any identifiable appearance by a candidate, either
by voice or picture (Flint 50). Now, with increased emphasis placed on the
attainment of a candidate’s legally qualified status in order for that candidate’s
appearances to constitute a “use,” Media Access Project believes that this will
allow independent groups—such as political action committees (PACs)—to
aggressively promote their favorite candidates w ithout triggering a “use” as
depicted in Section 315 of the political broadcasting laws (Flint 50).
Several groups of broadcasters—including the CBS and ABC television
networks—and the National Association of Broadcasters have filed complaints
with the FCC (Flint 50). They contend that the “news adjacency rate,” which
applies to political advertisers who choose to air their spots immediately prior
to and after a news broadcast, is unnecessary (Flint 50).

The broadcasters

believe that the time before and after the newscasts should be priced and sold
to political advertisers in a manner that is consistent w ith that offered to
commercial advertisers (Flint 50).
Additionally, the broadcasters disagree with the provision that requires
them to insert the sponsorship identification in an advertisement that does not
meet the necessary FC C requirements (Flint 50). They see themselves put into
the position that the advertiser should be in, because the liability for compliance
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with the sponsorship identification is on the broadcaster instead of the advertiser
(Flint 50).
At the same time, the broadcasters themselves come under fire for
requiring up-front payment from political advertisers. The Federal Election
Commission (FEC) insists that broadcasters ease the rules for advance payment
(“In-credit-able” 22). The chief of the F C C ’s political programming branch
states that “requiring advance payment is inappropriate” if a candidate or a
candidate’s agency has a credit history that is comparable to the commercial
advertisers that are allowed to pay on credit (“In-credit-able” 22).

Since a

candidate w ith an unfavorable credit rating can hire and use an agency with a
favorable credit history, there are several political consulting agencies that are
unhappy with the thought that they may be pressured into sacrificing their own
good credit ratings on behalf of candidates who may be unable to pay the bills
(“In-credit-able” 22).

CH A PTER 3

The Role of the Courts
The courts at both the Federal and state levels have dealt rather
extensively with several aspects of political advertising.

This chapter will

examine some of the more compelling judicial treatments of political advertising.
These cases, heard in various venues from the Supreme C ourt down to the state
district courts, deal with issues ranging from advertising rates for politicians to
provisions placing restrictions on campaign literature.
The first such case, A C L U v. Jennings, which was decided in 1973 by the
U.S. District Court in the District of Columbia, is considered a landmark
decision due to the magnitude of its outcome. Jennings is significant in that it
appears to have the effect of helping to determine what constitutes a political
advertisement and what does not. In Jennings, the plaintiff, the American Civil
Liberties Union, sought to publish an advertisement during the 1972 presidential
campaign that had the effect of denouncing the incumbent {ACLU v. Jennings
1973). The advertisement, which the plaintiff submitted for publication to The
New York Times in September of 1972, expressed the A CLU ’s opposition to the
Nixon Administration-backed legislation which was designed to limit court-
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ordered busing {ACLU v. Jennings 1973). In the advertisement, the plaintiff
listed the names of the 102 members of the House of Representatives who had
previously opposed this antibusing policy {ACLU v. Jennings 1973). While the
plaintiff did hope to generate favorable public opinion to their position by
publishing the ad, there was no intention by the plaintiff to aid in the election
or reelection of any political candidate {ACLU v. Jennings 1973).

Upon

receiving the advertisement, the New York Times notified the plaintiff that their
failure to comply w ith the certification requirements of Title I of the 1971
Federal Election Campaign Act precluded them from printing their advertise
ment {ACLU v. Jennings 1973).
The Title I certification requirement is such that any person who wants
to publish an advertisement for a candidate has to obtain certification from that
candidate stating that the publication of the advertisement would not have the
effect of exceeding the candidate’s allotted spending limits {ACLU v. Jennings
1973). Certification is also required in order to print statements made about
candidates in a derogatory fashion {ACLU v. Jennings 1973). The certification
was designed to establish the independence of the sponsor from any candidates
for election opposing the candidate who is denounced in the particular
advertisement {ACLU v. Jennings 1973).

The sponsor of a derogatory

advertisement must either state its source, or provide a disclaimer stating that

32

no other candidate has authorized the publication of the advertisement (ACLU
v. Jennings 1973).
The ACLU filed suit alleging that Title I was unconstitutional in that it
imposed undue burdens that had the effect of infringing upon the First and
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution (ACLU v. Jennings 1973). After
the suit was filed, the district court ordered a preliminary injunction that
allowed The New York Times to publish a revised copy of the plaintiff’s original
advertisement on October 27, 1972 (ACLU v. Jennings 1973).

This revised

advertisement referred to the ongoing court dispute, proclaiming “It took a
court order to get this advertisement printed” (ACLU v. Jennings 1973).
Title I, while it applied to the media and not directly to the plaintiffs,
caused the plaintiffs to suffer harm as they were exposed to a prior restraint on
their right to speak freely (ACLU v. Jennings 1973). The restraint was enforced
by the Times, a private party, because of the threat of criminal sanctions under
Title I (ACLU v. Jennings 1973).
The defendants attempted to dismiss the proceedings on the grounds of
mootness because the advertisement had already run, but the court held that the
situation presented in the case was one that involved challenging a governmental
policy that is, in the words of the Roe Court, “capable of repetition, yet evading
review” (ACLU v. Jennings 1973).

The defendants submitted affidavits that

spoke to the effect that, in their opinions as governmental officials, the
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restrictions that would ordinarily be necessary under Title I would not apply
because the statute was never intended to apply to organizations such as the
ACLU, but to bona fide political committees that advocate certain candidates
for office (ACLU v. Jennings 1973).

The court held that the defendants’

affidavits only served to express an administrative judgement that is discretion
ary at best (ACLU v. Jennings 1973).
According to the court, “Title I is tantam ount to government prescrip
tion of what may or may not appear in public print” if the publication is
printed w ithout certification and the media is subject to criminal prosecution
(ACLU v. Jennings 1973). The court noted that previous attempts to impose
prior restraints on political speech have consistently met w ith “judicial disfavor”
(ACLU v. Jennings 1973). The sort of speech involved in this case is, as Justice
Brennan called it in Garrison v. Louisiana, “. . . more than self-expression, it is
the essence of self-government” (ACLU v. Jennings 1973). The district court
went on to state:
Any attempt to restrict the free and unfettered dissemination of such
opinions cannot be favorably viewed. The fact that restrictions have
been imposed in furtherance of matters of legitimate governmental
concern is neither dispositive nor, in this instance, persuasive (ACLU v.
Jennings 1973).
The court explained that Title I caused unacceptable prior restraints that
had the effect of discouraging open discussions on topics of public interest and
was, therefore, an unconstitutional means of achieving Congress’ objectives
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(ACLU v. Jennings 1973). The method by which these prior restraints are to be
enforced by the media appears to intensify the Title’s unconstitutional nature
(ACLU v. Jennings 1973). The court stated that the media should not be placed
in the role of the deciding factor as to whether or not a particular advertisement
meets the requirements under the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA),
since, in those instances when the media believes that a certain advertisement
may be permissible, but is unsure, the advertisement may not be published for
fear of potential criminal prosecution (ACLU v. Jennings 1973).
Overall, the court declared that “the airing of opinion in a public forum
must not be subordinated to political expediencies.” Therefore, the court held
Title I, subsection 104(b) to be facially unconstitutional (ACLU v. Jennings
1973).
Also under examination in the Jennings case was whether Title III of the
FECA was constitutional.

The effect of Title III upon the plaintiffs’ First

Amendment rights seemingly was not as clear cut as the court found Title I to
be (ACLU v. Jennings 1973).

Plaintiffs contended that the “reporting and

disclosure” requirements that Title III imposes on political committees that
would be triggered by the publication of the advertisement should be deemed
an unconstitutional violation of their right to freely associate (AC LU v. Jennings
1973). Publishing the names of those affiliated with the plaintiffs’ organization
would also be against their right to privacy (ACLU v. Jennings 1973).
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Title III defines political committees as groups that receive contributions
or spend more than $1,000 per year in order to influence the election of a
Federal candidate (ACLU v. Jennings 1973).

The plaintiff argued that the

vagueness of this definition concerning what constitutes a political committee
may be construed in such a way as to compel those organizations that wish to
express their opinions politically, but not advocate a particular candidate for
office, to submit to the disclosure requirements (ACLU v. Jennings 1973).
Seeking to avoid declaring all of Title III unconstitutional, however
unclear the definition of political committee was regarded as being, the court
stated:
We are of the opinion that the contested operational language of Title
III is susceptible to a limited and narrow construction which will at once
remove any chilling effects worked upon the plaintiffs as well as obviate
the necessity of this court having to invalidate the Title (ACLU v.
Jennings 1973).
The court went on to explain how the Second Circuit of the United
States C ourt of Appeals had previously defined political committees under Title
III as “those groups which solicit contributions or make expenditures, the major
purpose of which is the nomination or election of candidates into Federal
office” (ACLU v. Jennings 1973). Satisfied that this definition was in accordance
with the primary concern of the Act, which was campaign reform and
addressing the problems of excessive campaign expenditures, the court concluded
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that the plaintiff, on the basis of the advertisement submitted, was not subject
to the regulations required by Title III {ACLU v. Jennings 1973).
In Sadowski v. Shevin, the Florida Supreme Court reviewed a Florida
statute that restricted candidates for public office from making any use of the
advertising media except during a specified “political season” {Sadowski v. Shevin
1977). Sadowski was a candidate for a seat in the Florida House of Representa
tives whose opponent was the incumbent legislator {Sadowski v. Shevin 1977).
The statute prohibited Sadowski from filing for office and paying his filing fees
and party assessments until noon on July 6, 1976, the sixty-third day before the
primary, which was also after the scheduled adjournment of the regular session
of the Florida State Legislature {Sadowski v. Shevin 1977).
It was Sadowski’s intent to spend campaign funds for media advertising
and printing before qualifying for office, but he was prevented from doing so
because of Section 106.15(1) of the Florida Statutes that held:
N o person, candidate, political party, political committee or person
acting on behalf of another shall, prior to qualifying for office, directly
or indirectly in furtherance of any candidacy make use of:
(a)

Advertising on radio or television;

(b)

Advertising in newspapers, magazines or periodicals;

(c)

Advertising on billboards, banners or streamers;

(d)

Advertising on campaign literature or any other printing; or
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(e)

A rented hall in which to address the public. (Sadowski v. Shevin
1977)

Sadowski filed a complaint seeking to have Section 106.15(1) declared unconsti
tutional because he contended that it abridged his constitutional right to speak
out on the public issues of the day, including the activities of the Florida
legislature while in session {Sadowski v. Shevin 1977).
In its review of the case, the Florida Supreme Court held that Section
106.15(1) of the Florida statutes, which regulated election activities, was a
restraint of free speech and a restriction on the “quantity of a candidate’s
communication and diversity of political speech” contrary to the dictates of the
Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo, as it constituted a limitation on candidate
spending {Sadowski v. Shevin 1977).

The statute denied candidates their

“fundamental right to speak to political issues and to advocate their candidacy
by making use of advertising” in the various media and in rented halls until they
were well within the described political season {Sadowski v. Shevin 1977).
Simply because candidates are allowed to spend unlimited amounts for
advertising activities w ithin the designated political season does not compensate
for the speech restraints, according to the court {Sadowski v. Shevin 1977).
The court went further in its holding to state that the people who
comprise the electorate are entitled to receive all the information that each
candidate can provide about himself, his opponent, and their specific stances on
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political issues (Sadowski v. Shevin 1977). The court believed that the entire
election process was hampered if the information was restricted or was
unavailable as the public’s “need to know ” was most critical during an election
campaign {Sadowski v. Shevin 1977).
Shevin, Florida’s attorney general, argued that section 106.15(1) advanced
an important governmental interest by protecting the public from “frivolous or
fraudulent candidacies” and that it prevented acts of deception and frustration
in the democratic process by restricting the use of campaign advertising to only
“serious candidates” {Sadowski v. Shevin 1977).
The court refuted this argument stating that the statute did not have the
ability to bring about this result because there was nothing in the act to prevent
a candidate from making his candidacy known to the public through means of
communication other than those specified by the statute {Sadowski v. Shevin
1977). Furthermore, the court stated that if the public were given the necessary
information, then it would be able to adequately fulfill its responsibility to sort
out the candidates in the field and decide which ones were serious as opposed
to those engaging in “political frivolity” {Sadowski v. Shevin 1977).

Thus,

because Section 106.15(1) was designed to serve as a limitation on the quantity
of political speech, the court declared the act unconstitutional as a violation of
freedom of political speech rights {Sadowski v. Shevin 1977).
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Libel
In 1964, the United States Supreme Court handed down a landmark
decision in the case of New York Times v. Sullivan. The C ourt held that a
publication is responsible for libel contained in any advertising it carries {New
York Times v. Sullivan 1964).

The rule arising out of Sullivan was that a

plaintiff, to prevail in a libel suit, must be able to prove w ith “convincing
clarity” before the court that the offensive statements were invalid and made
w ith “actual malice” {New York Times v. Sullivan 1964). Actual malice refers
to the knowledge that the questionable statements were false or were made w ith
“reckless disregard” of whether they were false or not {New York Times v.
Sullivan 1964).

Thus, it was necessary for a plaintiff to prove that the

newspaper had prior knowledge that the advertisement submitted was untrue
or that the publication acted in a “reckless” manner by not carefully scrutinizing
the content of the publication if the advertisement appeared questionable on its
face.
The “Sullivan rule” was at issue in the cases of Varanese v. Gall and
Cronley v. Pensacola News-Joumal.

In Varanese, the Ohio Supreme Court

declared that a newspaper’s liability for failure to check the accuracy of a
political advertisement was limited to those situations where the newspaper
actually knew before printing that the statement was false or where the
statement appeared to be facially false {Varanese v. Gall 1988). The plaintiff,
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Barbara Varanese, was a candidate for Geauga C ounty Commissioner and, at the
time the advertisement was published, she was serving as the Geauga County
Treasurer (Varanese v. Gall 1988).
The advertisement in question was submitted to the Geauga Times Leader
and the Maple Leaf Shopper by the Committee to Elect Tony Gall. Gall was the
plaintiff’s opponent for the county commission seat (Varanese v. Gall 1988).
The advertisement charged the plaintiff with various acts of misfeasance and
nonfeasance in her capacity as treasurer and positioned her as an advocate for
the elimination of various services including programs supporting veterans, the
elderly, and conservation (Varanese v. Gall 1988). The advertisement provided
footnotes to support the allegations, several of which cited the Geauga Times
Leader as a source of information (Varanese v. Gall

1988).

The plaintiff

ultimately lost her election bid (Varanese v. Gall 1988).
At the trial court, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgement
asserting that, as a public official, the plaintiff was required to show that the
defendant acted with actual malice (Varanese v. Gall 1988). The defendant
contended that the plaintiff could produce no evidence sufficient to demonstrate
such actual malice with “convincing clarity” (Varanese v. Gall 1988).
While the trial court was in apparent agreement w ith the defendant and
granted his motion for summary judgement, the O hio C ourt of Appeals

41

reversed this ruling on appeal (Varanese v. Gall 1988). The court of appeals
reasoned that,
. . . the record contains evidence from which a jury could determine
with convincing clarity that Lake-Geauga Printing Co. published the
advertisement with actual malice, and w ith a high degree of awareness
of its probable falsity (Varanese v. Gall 1988).
The case was then appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court, which reversed
the decision handed down by the court of appeals ( Varanese v. Gall 1988). The
court stated that the case hinged on a single question: W hether or not the
appellee, Varanese, presented enough evidence to withstand appellant’s m otion
for summary judgement on the question of actual malice (Varanese v. Gall
1988).

The court found that appellee’s evidence of actual malice to be

insufficient (Varanese v. Gall 1988). The court reasoned that, at the time the
advertisement was printed, Varanese was a public official and, thus, she bore the
burden of proving, with convincing clarity, that Gall published the advertise
ment with actual malice (Varanese v. Gall 1988). The court explained that the
Supreme Court, in New York Times v. Sullivan, held that reckless disregard on
the part of the newspaper must be established by “clear and convincing
evidence” that the publication went ahead and published the piece w ith “a high
awareness of . . . probable falsity,” or that “[it] entertained serious doubts as to
the truth of the publication” (Varanese v. Gall 1988).
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The thrust of Varanese’s argument was that the Gall had ready access to
information that should have brought about questions as to the truthfulness of
the advertisement, or that should have prompted some form of investigation
into its accuracy (Varanese v. Gall

1988). The court stated that while the

allegations, if true, might raise the issue of negligence, they did not reach the
level of showing actual malice (Varanese v. Gall 1988). The court reasoned that
political advertisements, unlike news stories, are not generated from within a
media organization, which should diminish the responsibility of the media for
verifying the accuracy of any statements contained in such advertisements
{Varanese v. Gall 1988). The failure to check the tru th of a statement is not
enough of a basis to raise the issue of actual malice unless the statement is
“facially incredible” or the defendant had a “subjective reason” to question the
reliability of a source {Varanese v. Gall 1988). Because the record did not
contain any evidence that Gall had any subjective reason to doubt the reliability
of the sources of the advertisement, the court concluded that there was no
evidence of actual malice on his part (Varanese v. Gall 1988).
The case of Cronley v. Pensacola News-Joumal was similar to Varanese in
that it involved a public official political candidate who brought forth a libel
action against a newspaper that had published an article and an advertisement
that were, in the appellant’s opinion, defamatory {Cronley v. Pensacola NewsJoumal 1990). The first district of the Florida C ourt of Appeals held in May
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of 1990 that since the appellant was a public figure and had to prove actual
malice on the part of the newspaper, the trial court was proper in dismissing the
case in favor of the newspaper because the “undisputed material facts failed to
reveal a basis for a jury to render a verdict in the appellant’s favor” {Cronley v.
Pensacola News-Joumall990).

The court stated that both the appellee’s

advertising director and executive editor acted in good faith to publish truthful
statements by providing background evidence as to the validity of the
advertisement’s allegations {Cronley v. Pensacola News-Joumal 1990). Since it
could not be shown with convincing clarity that the allegedly defamatory
statements were made with actual malice, the court affirmed the trial court’s
summary judgement motion for the appellee newspaper {Cronley v. Pensacola
News-Joumal 1990).
A libel action was also at the heart of a case heard by the Alabama
Supreme C ourt in July of 1992. In Camp v. Yeager, the appellee advertising
agency (Yeager) produced a televised political advertisement that, according to
the court record, contained statements that the agency knew were false {Camp
v. Yeager 1992). The commercial was challenged as being defamatory because
it stated that the public “got hit with three rate increases” while the appellant
was the president of the Alabama Public Service Commission (APSC) and that
“as a reward”, the appellant received over $760,000 in consultant fees {Camp v.
Yeager 1992). The court record illuminated the fact that Camp voted against all
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three rate increases and that such increases are not granted under the control of
the APSC, but only pursuant to state court orders (Camp v. Yeager 1992).
Furthermore, the fact that he received over $700,000 in consulting fees did not
arise directly due to his service as a public service commissioner (Camp v. Yeager
1992). After Camp left the APSC, he opened his own consulting firm and he
entered into a three-year contract with Georgia Power Company to perform
economic development work, labor relations consulting, and consulting on
public relations and regulatory affairs involving nuclear generation of electric
power (Camp v. Yeager 1992).
The Alabama Supreme Court held that such statements, obviously made
w ithout the necessary background knowledge, were capable of having
defamatory meanings (Camp v. Yeager 1992). The court relied on the reasoning
it set forth in the case of Loveless v. Graddick:
The test to factually determine the defamatory nature of a statement is
that meaning would be ascribed to the language by the reader or listener
of average or ordinary intelligence, or by a common mind (Camp v.
Yeager 1992).
The court stated that because the appellant was a public figure, a false or
defamatory statement may be made intentionally and with ill will toward the
public figure, but the public figure may be ineligible for a remedy if the
statement was made without the knowledge of its falsity or w ithout “reckless
disregard” of its validity (Camp v. Yeager 1992). This rule, brought forth in the
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case of Mobile Press Register, Inc. v. Faulkner, is based on the rationale espoused
by the Supreme Court in Garrison v. Louisiana (Camp v. Yeager 1992). The
Garrison C ourt held that debate on public issues should not be inhibited if the
speaker runs the risk that what he may say will be brought to court in order
to prove that he spoke out of hatred (Camp v. Yeager 1992). Such statements
that are honestly believed by a public official, even if spoken out of hatred,
contribute to the “free exchange of ideas and the ascertainment of tru th ” (Camp
v. Yeager 1992).
Based on the former court ruling, the Alabama Supreme C ourt decided
that the trial court erred in granting the advertising agency summary judgement
because the appellant presented evidence that was “clear and convincing” enough
for a jury to “reasonably determine” that the agency knew that the statements
made in the televised political advertisement were false (Camp v. Yeager 1992).
The court was not unanimous in its decision in the Camp case and
Justice Maddox’s dissenting opinion is w orthy of discussion. Maddox explained
how the case of New York Times v. Sullivan should be the controlling legal
guideline (Camp v. Yeager 1992). Maddox argued that,-even if the appellant was
able to prove that the television commercial contained a false statement and that
it was defamatory, “public officials and political candidates . . . should be men
[and women] of fortitude” and should not expect to be protected from the
harshness of the political arena (Camp v. Yeager 1992). Thus, Maddox stated,
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such public officials should not be entitled to a trial on the issues (Camp v.
Yeager 1992).
Maddox cited how the Supreme Court in New York Times v. Sullivan
came extremely close to declaring that political speech, even speech that is false
and defamatory, had absolute protection under the First Amendment (Camp v.
Yeager 1992).

New York Times v. Sullivan was decided, as the Supreme Court

expressed it,
[A]gainst the background of a profound national commitment to the
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide open, and that it may well contain vehement, caustic, and
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks upon government and public
officials (Camp v. Yeager 1992).
Maddox further made the case that “the substance of the television
commercial was not materially different” from the newspaper story of the same
facts (Camp v. Yeager 1992). The court record depicted how the appellee created
the television commercial content, in part, on information that appeared in two
published articles (Camp v. Yeager 1992). In comparing the news accounts with
the television commercial, Maddox concluded that the “implication and
innuendos” were essentially the same between the tw o (Camp v. Yeager 1992).
Both forms of communication referred to a former public service commissioner
who “received $770,000 from a sister company of a company he regulated”
when he served as the president of the Alabama Public Service Commission
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(Camp v. Yeager 1992). Maddox went on to state that even if the “implications
and innuendos” among the tw o were different, the
. . . television commercial was just the kind of protected political speech
that the Supreme C ourt of the United States found to be protected in
New York Times v. Sullivan (Camp v. Yeager 1992).
Maddox then expressed how he would affirm the summary judgement ruling of
the trial court because he believed that the appellant failed to show that he
could prove, in a clear and convincing manner, that the appellee’s speech was
not protected by the First Amendment (Camp v. Yeager 1992).

A R etu rn t o th e Fairness D o c tr in e
The Supreme Court was the forum in which tw o cases that dealt with
the “fairness doctrine” were heard. During political campaigns, the fairness
doctrine refers to the treatment that the media are required to give those
candidates seeking office. Generally speaking, the fairness doctrine would apply
in a case in which a story aired that presented the views of one of the two
candidates in a race w ithout presenting the views of the opponent. In such a
situation, the fairness doctrine requires that both candidates’ views receive
treatment by the media. O f course, the fairness doctrine comes into play in
cases that do not involve political candidates, as well. The combined case of
Red Lion Broadcasting, Co. v. Federal Communications Commission and U.S. v.
Radio Television News Directors Association allowed the Supreme C ourt to
analyze the fairness doctrine.
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The case arose when the plaintiff, Red Lion Broadcasting, the operator
of a radio station in Pennsylvania, aired a fifteen-minute broadcast on November
27,1964 (Red Lion Broadcasting, Co. v. Federal Communications Commission and
U.S. v. Radio Television News Directors Association 1969; hereafter Red Lion and
RTNDA 1969). During the broadcast, Reverend Billy James Hargis discussed a
book written by Fred J. Cook titled Goldwater—Extremist on the Right (Red
Lion and RTND A 1969).

Hargis stated that Cook had been fired by a

newspaper as a result of false charges made against city officials, that Cook had
worked for a communist-affiliated publication, that he defended Alger Hiss and
attacked J. Edgar Hoover and the CIA, and now C ook had written a book to
“smear and destroy” Barry Goldwater (Red Lion and RTND A 1969).

In

response, Cook demanded reply time and the station refused (Red Lion and
RTNDA 1969).
The FC C determined that the broadcast constituted a personal attack on
Cook and that the station failed to meet its obligation under the fairness
doctrine to send a tape, transcript, or summary of the broadcast to Cook and
offer him reply time (Red Lion and RTND A 1969). The Court of Appeals
upheld the FC C ’s position and the Supreme Court affirmed, stating that the
specific application of the fairness doctrine in Red Lion was authorized by
Congress (Red Lion and RTND A 1969).
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The Radio Television News Directors Association (RTNDA) portion of the
case involved a new rule adopted by the FCC to make the personal attack
aspect of the fairness doctrine more precise and enforceable (Red Lion and
RTND A 1969). RTND A also sought to specify the rules relating to political
editorials deemed to be unconstitutional (Red Lion and RTND A 1969). The
Supreme Court held that the specific application of the fairness doctrine,
authorized by Congress, served to enhance—rather than abridge—freedoms of
speech and the press protected by the First Amendment (Red Lion and RTNDA
1969).
The “new rule” required that when views were presented on controver
sial issues of public importance, any attack made on the “honesty, character,
integrity or like personal qualities of an identified person or group” will
mandate that the station licensee inform the recipient of the attack within at
least one week (RedLion and RTND A 1969). The date, time, and identification
of the broadcast and a script, tape, or accurate summary of the broadcast must
be made available to the “attackee,” along with an offer of a reasonable
opportunity to respond using the licensee’s facilities (Red Lion and RTNDA
1969). The rule applies to: Attacks on foreign groups or foreign public figures;
personal attacks made by a candidate, authorized spokesperson or any other
person associated w ith the campaign on another candidate; attacks presented
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during newscasts, news interviews or on-the-spot news coverage (Red Lion and
RTNDA 1969).
W hen the situation arises where a licensee editorially endorses or opposes
a legally qualified candidate or candidates, the licensee, within a day after the
editorial is aired, must notify the candidate attacked as well as the other
candidate or candidates in the race (Red Lion and RTNDA 1969). Editorials
aired w ithin 72 hours before the election must make the necessary allowances
for timely responses to be made by the attacked candidate or other candidates
in the race (Red Lion and RTNDA 1969).
The C ourt held that, w ithout the fairness doctrine, a licensee could have
the ability to ban all campaign appearances by candidates themselves from the
air and deliver only the views of candidates supported by the broadcaster to the
exclusion of all other candidates (Red Lion and RTNDA 1969). The fairness
doctrine serves to prohibit the broadcaster from exerting such a dominating
control over the exposure of candidates by the broadcaster in a given election
(Red Lion and RTND A 1969).
The fairness doctrine was also at issue in the joint cases of Columbia
Broadcasting System v. Democratic National Committee, Federal Communications
Commission v. Business Executives' Move For Vietnam Peace, Post-Newsweek
Stations v. Business Executives' Move For Vietnam Peace, and American Broadcast
ing Companies v. Democratic National Committee [to be cited as CBS v. DNC\.

51

In these cases, the fairness doctrine was examined by the Federal Communica
tions Commission, which declared that the policy of radio and television
licensees of not selling editorial advertising time was not in violation of the
Federal Communications Act of 1934, nor was it a violation of the First
Amendment (CBS v. D N C 1973).

The plaintiffs held that responsible

individuals had a right to purchase editorial advertisement time to comment on
public issues w ithout worrying if the broadcaster was in compliance with the
fairness doctrine (CBS v. D N C 1973).
The C ourt of Appeals reversed the decision of the FCC and stated that
the broadcasters’ policy of refusing paid editorial time violated the First
Amendment, as other sorts of paid commercial advertisements were permissible
(CBS v. D N C 1973). The United States Supreme C ourt reversed the Court of
Appeals and the Court majority was in agreement with the reasoning of the
FCC (CSS v. D N C 1973).
Parts I, II, and IV constituted the majority opinion of the Court (Id. at
735). To begin with, Justice Burger, writing for the majority, stated that a case
based on First Amendment grounds must be evaluated w ithin the statutory and
regulatory scheme that had been developed over the years by the decisions
rendered in the Congress and by the FCC (CBS v. D N C 1973). In the past,
Congress had consistently rejected attempts to impose a “common carrier” right
of access to broadcaster facilities for any and all individuals seeking to express
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their views on public issues (CBS v. D N C 1973). The fairness doctrine came
into being to require that broadcasters’ coverage of important public issues be
adequate enough so that differing viewpoints could be reflected (CBS v. D NC
1973). Further, the majority went on to proclaim that no private individual or
group could command the use of broadcast facilities (CBS v. D N C 1973).
The C ourt expressed that the public interest standard of the Communica
tions Act, w ithin which First Amendment principles are contained, did not go
so far as to require broadcasters to accept editorial advertisements (CBS v. D NC
1973). According to the C ourt, the FC C was correct in deciding that the public
interest in having a “marketplace” sort of access for ideas and experiences would
not be satisfied by ordering a right of access to advertising time (CBS v. D NC
1973). There was an inherent risk that such a system would be monopolized
by those who could afford air time costs and, thus, the operation of the fairness
doctrine would be “undermined” (CBS v. D N C 1973). The public accountability
on the broadcaster would be diluted (CBS v. D N C 1973).
Such an absolute right of access would require the FC C to be involved
on a case-by-case basis in deciding who should be heard and when, which would
have the effect of dramatically increasing the involvement of the government in
broadcasting operations (CBS v. D N C 1973). The Court stated that the public
interest dictates that a substantial degree of journalistic discretion must remain
with broadcasters (CBS v. D N C 1973).
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Justice Stewart, who concurred with the majority, made the separate
point that since private broadcasters were, as members of the press, protected
by the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of the press, it would be
unnecessary to hold that First Amendment protection of free speech required
the government to impose controls, as sought in this case, to protect First
Amendment values (CBS v. D NC 1973). If private broadcasters were considered
a part of the government, then the private newspapers and their freedoms of the
press would likewise be gone (CBS v. D N C 1973). According to Stewart, under
the public interest standards of the Communications Act, the FCC was not
incorrect in refusing to require that every broadcaster must accept paid, publicissue advertising (CBS v. D N C 1973).
In their dissenting opinion, Justices Brennan and Marshall began by
explaining that the public nature of the airwaves, the Federal licensing of
broadcasters, the regulation of programming, and the FC C ’s specific approval
of broadcasters’ absolute bans against accepting editorial advertisements are all
actions taken by the government and are, therefore, subject to the auspices of
the First Amendment (CBS v. D N C 1973).

The fairness doctrine, in their

opinion, was not sufficient to satisfy the First Amendment interests between
individuals and the public in an uninhibited exchange of views on items of a
controversial nature that concerned matters of public importance (CBS v. D N C
1973). When the interests and First Amendment rights of the broadcasters, the
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public as a whole, and individuals wishing to express their views are all weighed
against each other, the ban on all editorial advertisements violates the First
Amendment (CBS v. D N C 1973). Such a ban, according to the dissenters, is
particularly hard to swallow because the same air time is available for
commercial advertisers (CBS v. D N C 1973). The justices believed that the Court
of Appeals decided the case correctly when they left broad latitude to the FCC
and the licensees to develop reasonable regulations to govern a limited right of
access for editorial advertising (CBS v. D N C 1973).

R easonable A ccess
The Supreme C ourt was also the venue for the joint cases of CBS v.
FCC, A B C v. FCC, and NBC v. FCC, where these three television networks
petitioned the C ourt for review of FCC orders holding that they had failed to
meet their obligation to allow for reasonable access by federal candidates for the
purchase of broadcast time (CBS v. FCC, A B C v. FCC, NBC v. FCC 1981).
O n October 11, 1979, the Carter-Mondale Presidential Committee
requested that each of the three major networks provide time for a paid thirtyminute program sometime between 8:00 p.m. and 10:30 p.m. on any day from
the fourth through the seventh of December 1979 (CBS v. FCC, A B C v. FCC,
NBC v. FCC 1981).

It was the intention of the Committee to present, in

conjunction w ith the formal announcement of President C arter’s candidacy, a
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documentary that was to outline the record of his administration (CBS v. FCC,
ABC v. FCC, NBC v. FCC 1981).
All three networks refused to provide the requested time to the
Committee (CBS v. FCC, A B C v. FCC, NBC v. FCC 1981). CBS stated that
there were many candidates in the field competing for the presidential
nomination and that the potential disruption of regular programming in order
to allow for requests for equal treatment was significant. But, CBS did offer to
sell a five-minute segment at 10:55 p.m. on December 8, and an additional fiveminute segment in the daytime (CBS v. FCC, A B C v. FCC, NBC v. FCC 1981).
ABC indicated that it had not determined when it would begin selling political
time for the 1980 presidential campaign, but it later decided that it would
permit such sales in January 1980 (CBS v. FCC, ABC v. FCC, NBC v. FCC
1981). NBC also expressed that it was not prepared to sell time for political
programs as early as December of 1979, as the potential existed for so many
time requests for the several candidates (CBS v. FCC, A B C v. FCC, NBC v. FCC
1981).
The Carter-Mondale Committee filed a complaint with the FCC charging
that the networks had violated their obligation to provide “reasonable access”
under Section 312(a)(7), part of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971,
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which authorizes the FCC to revoke any broadcasting station license,
. . . for willful or repeated failure to allow reasonable access to or to
permit purchase of reasonable amounts of time for the use of a broadcast
station by a legally-qualified candidate for Federal elective office on
behalf of his candidacy (CBS v. FCC, A B C v. FCC, NBC v. FCC 1981).
The FCC, in their ruling, held that the networks had violated the statute
and that their reasons for refusing to sell the time requested were “deficient”
under the FC C ’s standard of reasonableness (CBS v. FCC, A B C v. FCC, NBC
v. FCC 1981). A t the time of their decision, the FCC directed the networks to
indicate, by a specified date, exactly the manner in which they intended to
fulfill their statutory obligation (CBS v. FCC, A B C v. FCC, NBC v. FCC 1981).
The Supreme C ourt stated that when the FCC is faced with reviewing
a decision that a broadcaster has made in terms of whether to provide the
requested time or not, only two questions are to be considered:
(1)

Has the broadcaster adverted to the proper standards in deciding
whether to grant a request for access, and

(2)

Is the broadcaster’s explanation for his decision reasonable in
terms of those standards (CBS v. FCC, A B C v. FCC, NBC v. FCC
1981)?

The C ourt commented that the legislative history confirmed that Section
312(a)(7) created a vehicle that enlarged the scope of the political broadcasting
responsibilities of licensees (CBS v. FCC, ABC v. FCC, NBC v. FCC 1981). The
report of the Senate Commerce Committee stated that one of the key purposes
of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 was,
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. . . to give candidates for public office greater access to the media so that
they may better explain their stand on the issues, and thereby more fully
and completely inform the voters (CBS v. FCC, A B C v. FCC, NBC v.
FCC 1981).
Indeed, the C ourt noted that the legislative history supports the plain
meaning of the statute in that individual candidates for federal elective office
have a right of reasonable access to the use of stations for paid political
broadcasts on behalf of their candidacies without regard to w hether an opponent
has secured time as well (CBS v. FCC, ABC v. FCC, NBC v. FCC 1981).
The Court continued in its reasoning to state that Section 312(a)(7)
makes a significant contribution to freedom of expression by enhancing the
ability of candidates to present to the public the information necessary for the
effective operation of the democratic process (CBS v. FCC, A B C v. FCC, NBC
v. FCC 1981). The statute represented an effort by Congress to guarantee that
a resource as important as the airwaves be used in the interest of the public
(CBS v. FCC, A B C v. FCC, NBC v. FCC 1981). The C ourt concluded that this
statutory right of access “properly balances the First Amendment rights of
Federal candidates, the public and broadcaster” (CBS v. FCC, A B C v. FCC, NBC
v. FCC 1981).
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L ow est-un it-ch arge
During a political campaign, candidates are faced with the challenge of
trying to get their message across to the voters. Often, laws are passed that help
to facilitate this process. An interesting case out of Florida, Gore Newspapers
Company v. Shevin, involved newspaper publishers who sought to declare two
Florida state statutes unconstitutional because they had the effect of requiring
newspapers and broadcasters to charge political candidates the lowest local
advertising rate, and prohibited the airing or printing of any item on election
day that could be perceived as an attack “against the candidate” (Gore Newspa
pers Company v. Shevin 1975).

The plaintiffs in this case were newspaper

publishers who believed that the two statute requirements were in violation of
the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution (Gore Newspapers
Company v. Shevin 1975).
The defendant, Shevin, was the attorney general for the State of Florida
and had issued a series of opinions as to the constitutionality of the statutes and
their applicability to the plaintiffs (Gore Newspapers Company v. Shevin 1975).
The defendant also stated, by letter, that the statutes would be enforced against
the plaintiffs if they were ever violated, and that criminal proceedings would be
instituted (Gore Newspapers Company v. Shevin 1975).
Prevailing business practice was that the lowest local rate charged by the
plaintiffs went into effect only when a client contracted to purchase 25,000
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column-inches during a period of one year (Gore Newspapers Company v. Shevin
1975).

Political candidates were charged the same rates—higher, or less

discounted—that other, less frequent advertisers were charged (Gore Newspapers
Company v. Shevin 1975).
Chapter 106 of the Florida statutes stated that publishers and broadcast
ers may not charge a political candidate any more than the “lowest local rate”
available to advertisers (Gore Newspapers Company v. Shevin 1975). The statute
also held that no one political candidate could be charged more for advertising
than any other political candidate (Gore Newspapers Company v. Shevin 1975).
A violation of the statute would entail a fine to the guilty corporation of
$10,000, along with a “forfeiture of its right to do business in the state” (Gore
Newspapers Company v. Shevin 1975).
While the plaintiffs argued that the statute was created by politicians to
give politicians a preferred status, the state countered that the statute was a valid
exercise of the state’s police power to allow those individuals who may be
otherwise financially prevented from seeking public office the opportunity to
do so (Gore Newspapers Company v. Shevin 1975). The plaintiffs also stated that
the economic regulation imposed by the statute w ith its limitation upon
advertising revenue makes the press “vulnerable to be ‘taxed’ out of existence
or into silence” (Gore Newspapers Company v. Shevin 1975).
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The U.S. Florida District Court ruled that the statute did not compel the
plaintiffs to print advertisements for the candidates, but that it only required
that the rate for the advertisements must be at the lowest local advertising rate
(Gore Newspapers Company v. Shevin 1975). The publisher or broadcaster was
free to decline all political advertising if it was not profitable (Gore Newspapers
Company v. Shevin 1975). According to the court,
If the loss of revenue would prove to be significant, the newspapers
might very well decide to decline all political advertising, thus severely
limiting media access for all candidates whether well-heeled or running
on a shoestring (Gore Newspapers Company v. Shevin 1975).
The effort of the legislature in its attempt to make news media
advertising available to candidates was commendable, stated the court, but the
exercise of the state’s police power had been the subject of several statutes that
restrained the content of the publication, and which had been struck down by
the Supreme Court (Gore Newspapers Company v. Shevin 1975). The mere fact
that the restraint in this case was aimed at revenue instead of content did not
insulate it from the “binds” of the First Amendment (Gore Newspapers Company
v. Shevin 1975). Thus, the First Amendment prior restraints by the government
extended to the lessening of advertising revenue, making the lowest local rate
provision invalid (Gore Newspapers Company v. Shevin 1975).
The state of Texas also treated particular aspects of the lowest-unit-charge
rule in a unique fashion. This is apparent in the case of K VU E v. Moore.
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A Texas statute that allowed for year-round lowest unit rate political
advertising was at issue in this case (KVUE v. Moore 1983). The Fifth Circuit
of the United States Court of Appeals held that the Texas statute was
unconstitutional because it applied year-round, thereby widening the scope of
the advertising rate provisions of the Communications Act Section 315, and
further applying the discounted rates to both candidate and issue-oriented
political advertising (KVUE v. Moore 1983). The FCC was deemed responsible
for the enforcement of Section 315, which allows the lowest unit rate charge 45
days before a primary election and 60 days before a general election (KVUE v.
Moore 1983). The Texas statute, Article 14.09(B), prohibited radio and television
stations from charging a rate for political advertising that is more than the
lowest unit charged to the station’s “most favored advertisers” for the same class,
condition and duration of time (KVUE v. Moore 1983).
In reviewing the legislative history of the Communications Act Section
315, the court held that Congress and the FCC intentionally limited the scope
of the Act to require broadcasters to charge the lowest unit rate to candidates
and their campaign committees only (KVUE v. Moore 1983). According to the
court,
This extension of the statute’s coverage to noncandidates and the lowestunit-charge to a year-round rule stands as an obstacle to the achievement
of Congress’ purpose in enacting the rate regulation statute (KVUE v.
Moore 1983).
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The Texas statute had the effect of conflicting with the Federal statute
by lengthening—rather than shortening—the campaign season (KVUE v. Moore
1983).

It also brought about greater campaign spending by encouraging

candidates and noncandidates (issues) to advertise on a year-round basis (KVUE
v. Moore 1983).

Finally, the Texas statute imposed a heavier burden on

broadcasters to make these lower rates available year-round (KVUE v. Moore
1983). The court declared the Texas statute unconstitutional by means of the
Supremacy Clause because the Federally-enacted legislation supersedes legislation
passed at the state level (KVUE v. Moore 1983).

Censorship
The second aspect of the case of Gore Newspapers Company v. Shevin
dealt with a prohibition against publishing attacks against a candidate on the day
of the election. The plaintiffs stipulated that material published in its electionday edition of the newspaper may have included old charges or adverse
information about candidates that may have been considered to be attacks
against the candidates (Gore Newspapers Company v. Shevin 1975). Section 104
of the Florida statutes was written with the intent of preventing any last minute
“smear tactics” against candidates, and the law had existed w ithout being
questioned since 1909 (Gore Newspapers Company v. Shevin 1975).
The plaintiffs argued that the requirement that forbade publishing any
negative attacks against a candidate should be declared unconstitutional based

63

on the decision rendered in the case of Mills v. Alabama (Gore Newspapers
Company v. Shevin 1975). In Mills, the Supreme Court held that an Alabama
law, which made it a crime to “solicit any votes in support of or in opposition
to any proposition” on the day of the election, was unconstitutional as it
violated the First Amendment (Gore Newspapers Company v. Shevin 1975). In
that case, an editor of an Alabama newspaper was arrested after an editorial
advocating a particular proposition was printed on election day (Gore
Newspapers Company v. Shevin 1975).
The district court was in agreement with the plaintiffs.

It ruled the

Florida statute fit nicely within the parameter of the Mills decision and,
therefore, declared Section 104 of the Florida state statutes unconstitutional as
a violation of the First Amendment (Gore Newspapers Company v. Shevin 1975).
The court felt that the newspapers and broadcasters should be free to print or
air whatever they chose regarding a candidate on election day and that they
should not be censored, which the existing law had the capability of doing
(Gore Newspapers Company v. Shevin 1975).
The issue of censorship also involved the broadcast medium in the case
of Kuczo v. Western Connecticut Broadcasting.

In Kuczo, the Connecticut

District Court concluded, in 1976, that a radio station’s review and censorship
of two mayoral candidates’ political advertisements constituted Federal action
subject to the First Amendment (Kuczo v. Western Connecticut Broadcasting
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1976). The case arose during the 1969 Stamford, Connecticut, mayoral election
when two of the three candidates—plaintiffs Kuczo and Nocerino—had their
radio political advertisement scripts reviewed and edited by the defendant radio
station’s general manager prior to airing (Kuczo v. Western Connecticut
Broadcasting 1976). Schwartz, the station’s general manager, did not review or
edit the audio scripts of the third candidate, who was ultimately elected to office
(Kuczo v. Western Connecticut Broadcasting 1976).
The FCC conducted a hearing after a complaint was submitted to the
regulatory agency by the plaintiffs (Kuczo v. Western Connecticut Broadcasting
1976). The FCC ruled that the radio station’s review and censorship of the
candidates’ scripts were a “flagrant violation” of Section 315(a) of the Communi
cation Act of 1934, and the defendants were fined $10,000 (Kuczo v. Western
Connecticut Broadcasting 1976). In the case before the Connecticut court, the
defendants maintained that no violation of the First Amendment occurred as the
plaintiffs alleged because there was no “governmental action” taken since the
station was a private operator, not an entity of the government (Kuczo v.
Western Connecticut Broadcasting 1976).
The Connecticut District Court stated that the core question in this case,
which had yet to be officially resolved in any forum, involved to what extent
actions taken by broadcasters who are licensed and regulated by the FCC—a
governmental agency—rise to a level to which they may be classified as
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constituting Federal action (Kuczo v. Western Connecticut Broadcasting 1976).
The court followed the reasoning of the Supreme Court in that court’s decision
in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co. where the Court held that,
[T]he inquiry must be whether there is a sufficiently close nexus between
the State and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the
action of the latter may be as fairly treated as that of the State itself
{Kuczo v. Western Connecticut Broadcasting 1976).
The district court held that the Federal government ensured that one
radio station licensee would have a monopoly of the Stamford airwaves and
that, if a candidate wanted to reach eligible voters over the radio, defendant’s
WSTC-AM and WSTC-FM were the most natural and effective vehicles
available {Kuczo v. Western Connecticut Broadcasting 1976).

In effect, by

granting the defendants a monopoly control over the airwaves, the FCC has
invested Western Connecticut Broadcasting w ith the ability to obstruct free
speech in the local elections {Kuczo v. Western Connecticut Broadcasting 1976).
The court continued in its reasoning to state how the essence of a
monopoly is a prime concern of the First Amendment {Kuczo v. Western
Connecticut Broadcasting 1976). Because the government delegated its control
over the local airways to a single radio station licensee, the opportunity for
abuses created by the monopoly that the First Amendment was specifically
designed to prohibit are obvious {Kuczo v. Western Connecticut Broadcasting
1976).

Simply because the station’s general manager was not a government
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employee does not allow him to avoid his constitutional responsibility as he
functions at his position under the auspices of a governmental license (Kuczo v.
Western Connecticut Broadcasting 1976). The court ruled that,
. . . it is this nexus between the governmental regulation and the
constitutional right in issue that imbues the defendant’s action with
governmental character vis-a-vis that right {Kuczo v. Western Connecticut
Broadcasting 1976).
Indeed, it is the government’s restrictions on competitive entry that magnify the
impact which its licensee ’s decisions can have on free speech.

The P ow er o f t h e Press
Can a newspaper legally adhere to a policy of not publishing paid
political advertisements on the day prior to the general election? The case of
Citizen Awareness Regarding Education v. Calhoun County Publishing, Inc., dealt
with precisely that concern.

In the case, a West Virginia trial court order,

which required the newspaper to publish a paid political advertisement
submitted by a local political action committee, was found to be a violation of
the First Amendment guarantee of a free press {Citizen Awareness Regarding
Education v. Calhoun County Publishing, Inc. 1991).
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals ruled that the government
can never require a private newspaper to print anything w ithout violating the
First Amendment {Citizen Awareness Regarding Education v. Calhoun County
Publishing, Inc. 1991).

The court record indicated that the newspaper had
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printed previous advertisements from the Citizens Awareness Regarding
Education political action committee—a group formed in order to oppose a local
school bond issue—but the paper refused to print an ad on May 3, 1991, because
they had a policy of not printing any political ads in the last issue prior to an
election (Citizen Awareness Regarding Education v. Calhoun County Publishing,
Inc. 1991). While the trial court granted an injunction on May 1, 1991, forcing
the newspaper to publish the advertisement, there existed no legal support for
the injunction sought by the political action committee and, thus, the granting
of the injunction was a violation of the First Amendment (Citizen Awareness
Regarding Education v. Calhoun County Publishing, Inc. 1991).

Monetary Limitations

on

Media A dvertising

The issue of media advertising costs was again raised in the case of
Abercrombie v. Bums.

However, unlike Gore, Abercrombie involved state-

imposed limitations on the amount of money political candidates could spend
in the news media (Abercrombie v. Bums 1974). The plaintiffs brought the suit
on the grounds that the statute was a violation of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments {Abercrombie v. Bums 1974).
Hawaii Act 185 limited the amount of money a political candidate could
spend during the course of an election, and set limits on the amount of money
that could be spent in the news media (Abercrombie v. Bums 1974).

The

purpose behind the limits in the expenditure provision was to permit potential
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candidates of limited means to seek office (Abercrombie v. Bums 1974).

A

standing committee report indicated that there must be an implementation of
the principle of equal opportunity in order to participate in the political process
{Abercrombie v. Bums 1974).
According to the Hawaii U.S. District Court, the equal opportunity
element was fulfilled by the limitation on the total amount of campaign
expenditure as stated in Subsection ll-206(a) {Abercrombie v. Bums 1974).
Limitations on the amount of advertising a candidate wished to spend on the
newspapers, magazines, and radio and television, as stated in Subsection (b), was
simply an additional, unwarranted burden {Abercrombie v. Bums 1974). But, a
law that infringes on free speech requires more than a rational basis to uphold
it {Abercrombie v. Bums 1974).

Clearly, the court stated, the requirement

imposed by Subsection (b) infringed on political speech {Abercrombie v. Bums
1974). The fact that a political announcement may be purchased in a news
media cannot force it into a category of lower-grade protection (Abercrombie v.
Bums 1974).

The distinction is between speech that is profit-motivated

(commercial), and speech that has an informational intent (political) (Abercrom
bie v. Bums 1974).
The Abercrombie court made reference to the case of U.S. v. O ’Brien,
which established the test to judge the limitations on media expenditures
{Abercrombie v. Bums 1974). The four test criteria were set as follows:
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(1)

A government requirement is justified if it is within the constitu
tional power of the government.

(2)

The requirement is justified if it furthers an important govern
mental interest.

(3)

The requirement is justified if the governmental interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression.

(4)

The requirement is justified if incidental restrictions on the
alleged First Amendment freedoms are no greater than necessary
to further that interest (Abercrombie v. Bums 1974).

According to the court, Act 185 satisfied the first three criteria, but failed
on the fourth (Abercrombie v. Bums 1974). The restriction of Subsection (b) of
the Act on First Amendment freedoms, on its face, appeared to be greater than
necessary to promote the principle of equality of opportunity to take part in the
political process (Abercrombie v. Bums 1974). This interest was amply protected
under Subsection ll-206(a), and the additional limitation created by Subsection
(b) on expenditures for advertising appeared to be an unjustifiable infringement
of the First Amendment freedoms (Abercrombie v. Bums 1974).

Limitations o n C orporate Political A ctivity
Federal campaign regulations have limited the ability of corporations to
participate in the political arena by prohibiting contributions made by
corporations to political candidates. However, a M ontana state statute, at issue
in the case of C&C Plywood v. Hanson, which forbade corporations or banks
from making contributions in order to promote or defeat a ballot issue, was
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declared an unconstitutional limitation of the corporation’s or bank’s First
Amendment rights (C&C Plywood v. Hanson 1990).
The N inth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the corporation’s rights
to express their views on “issues of general public interest” may not be abridged
by the state unless a compelling state interest is shown to exist (C&C Plywood
v. Hanson 1990). The court stated that when corporations seek to influence the
electorate and not an individual candidate or party, no such state interest exists
because corporate activities cannot create political debts like those contemplated
in the case of Buckley v. Valeo, which had the effect of limiting overall spending
in Federal political campaigns (C&C Plywood v. Hanson 1990). Just because a
corporation’s involvement may influence the outcome of a vote does not
adequately support the need to suppress corporate speech (C&C Plywood v.
Hanson 1990). Since the Montana statute had the effect of totally prohibiting
any contributions or payments, it was not “minimally regulatory,” but “totally
prescriptive and therefore overbroad” (C&C Plywood v. Hanson 1990).
The court concluded that the portion of the Montana statute that
forbade payments or contributions by corporations in support of or in
opposition to ballot issues was an unconstitutional restriction of the corpora
tion’s First Amendment rights (C&C Plywood v. Hanson 1990).

The court

further stated that, while regulations to ensure disclosure of the source of
payments or contributions may be enacted without a showing of a compelling
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state interest, the complete suppression of expression created by the Montana
statute was overbroad and, thus, impermissible {C&C Plywood v. Hanson 1990).
Corporate political activity was also at issue in the case of Austin v.
Michigan Chamber o f Commerce in which the Supreme Court held, in 1990, a
Michigan statute constitutional, even though it limited political speech, because
it was narrowly tailored and served a compelling state interest {Austin v.
Michigan Chamber o f Commerce 1990). Austin involved an advertisement the
Michigan Chamber of Commerce wanted to place in a publication in order to
advocate the candidacy of Richard Bardstra to the Michigan House of
Representatives {Austin v. Michigan Chamber o f Commerce 1990). The Chamber
was prevented from running the advertisement because of Section 54(1) of the
Michigan Campaign Financial Act, which prohibited all corporations from using
general treasury funds toward state political expenditures (Austin v. Michigan
Chamber o f Commerce 1990).
The advertisement was not run at the direction of the Bardstra campaign,
rather the advertisement was to be an “independent expenditure” which was not
made at “the direction of, or under control of, another person” (Geary 1992).
The Chamber was a nonprofit organization of about 8,000 members whose
activities included “speakfing] out on legislative, political, legal, economic, and
social issues that effect the business community” (Geary 1992). Funding for the
Chamber’s activities came from dues paid by all members to the general
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treasury, the same treasury that would have funded Bardstra’s advertisement
(Geary 1992).
In his Boston University Law Review article, Sean T. Geary stated that
Austin appeared to “foreclose the opportunity to make independent corporate
political expenditures” (Geary 1992).

Among the troubling reasoning, he

continued, was the C ourt’s broad definition of corruption that was defined as
“corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth,” a
distinction that, the C ourt held, corporations could attain more easily than
individuals (Geary 1992). According to Geary, the C ourt made this assumption
w ithout showing any actual proof of this effect (Geary 1992). He went on to
state that,
The corrupting influence of independent corporate expenditures should
be shown w ith some specificity to establish its allegedly greater degree
of danger relative to independent expenditures by individuals. This
showing would further explain the state interests that justify burdening
corporate free speech, the constitutional status of which the Court also
needs to define more adequately (Geary 1992).
The extent to which a newsletter is able to publish material that is
highly critical of a presidential candidate was the focus in the case of Federal
Election Committee v. Phillips Publishing. The respondent, Phillips Publishing,
was the publisher of a newsletter called The Pink Sheet on the Left (Federal
Election Committee v. Phillips Publishing 1981). The Pink Sheet was a for-profit
newsletter that targeted a conservative audience of about 14,000, and it had been
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in publication for ten years (Federal Election Committee v. Phillips Publishing
1981). The Pink Sheet—which served as a periodical not under the control of
any party, candidate or committee—claimed exemption under Section
431(a) (b)(7) of the United States Code, which provided that any promotional
material distributed by such an agency not controlled by any political entity is
exempt from any possible prosecution (Federal Election Committee v. Phillips
Publishing 1981).
The particular issue of The Pink Sheet in question in this case was printed
in early 1980 and distributed to subscribers and potential subscribers (Federal
Election Committee v. Phillips Publishing 1981). The tone of the issue was one
of an attack against the presidential candidacy of Senator Edward Kennedy
(Federal Election Committee v. Phillips Publishing 1981).
The Kennedy Presidential Committee filed a complaint to the Federal
Election Committee alleging that The Pink Sheet violated four Federal election
laws (Federal Election Committee v. Phillips Publishing 1981).

The Federal

Election Committee, in turn, issued a “reason to believe” letter to Phillips
Publishing stating that they may have violated Federal election laws (Federal
Election Committee v. Phillips Publishing 1981). The Federal Election Committee
believed that the following four statements from The Pink Sheet violated election
laws:
(1)

“We must stop Kennedy before he seizes the Presidency.”
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(2)

“You can help with this effort to stop Kennedy.”

(3)

“You learn how you can use this valuable information to help
defeat Teddy Kennedy’s drive for the Presidency.”

(4)

“W hether you are a man or woman, young or old, a business
man, teacher, student, employer, union member, or government
worker—you can actually help combat Teddy Kennedy and
advance the cause of conservatism in America” (Federal Election
Committee v. Phillips Publishing 1981).

The Federal Election Commission also thought that the edition of The
Pink. Sheet was in the form of a “solicitation letter,” as it was not in the form
of a news story, commentary, or editorial, thus excluding it from the Section
431(a) (b)(1) press exemption {Federal Election Committee v. Phillips Publishing
1981). The FEC alluded to the fact that The Pink Sheet was not printed with
the traditional heading typeface, publication information legend, and, addition
ally, it was addressed “Dear Friend” instead of “Dear Subscriber” {Federal
Election Committee v. Phillips Publishing 1981).
When the FEC issued their “reason to believe” letter, they also issued a
subpoena requesting that Phillips Publishing furnish the Commission informa
tion to refute the alleged violations {Federal Election Committee v. Phillips
Publishing 1981). The case at hand sought to resolve whether a district court
order enforcing the FE C ’s subpoena was justified. The court ultimately held
that the enforcement of the subpoena was not permissible {Federal Election
Committee v. Phillips Publishing 1981).
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The United States District Court ruled that the FEC did not challenge
the contention that Phillips Publishing was not owned or controlled by any one
political party or candidate {Federal Election Committee v. Phillips Publishing
1981). The court went on to declare that the fact that The Pink Sheet had been
published for ten years further confirms the fact that it was not simply
generated for this particular race {Federal Election Committee v. Phillips
Publishing 1981).

In essence, the FEC’s complaint was based only on the

supposition that a violation may have occurred (Federal Election Committee v.
Phillips Publishing 1981).
The court was particularly concerned with the FE C ’s subject matter
jurisdiction in this matter and they referred to the language of the Supreme
C ourt in the case of Sweezy v. New Hampshire when it said that,
. . . the power of compelling process [must] be carefully circumscribed
when the investigative process tends to impinge on such highly sensitive
areas of freedom of speech or press, freedom of political association, and
freedom of communication of ideas {Federal Election Committee v.
Phillips Publishing 1981).
The court concluded that since the FEC made no “threshold” showing
that a violation may have occurred, and chat it was unlikely that one would be
found, and since the danger exists that any further inquiry by the FEC might
violate the respondent’s First Amendment freedoms, the FE C ’s petition for
enforcement of its subpoena was to be denied {Federal Election Committee v.
Phillips Publishing 1981).
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C ampaign Signs
Hawaii was the site of another case in which the Hawaii U.S. District
C ourt decided a controversial case involving political advertising: Local
politicians were prohibited from displaying campaign signs. Ross v. Goshi arose
when the plaintiffs, a group of local politicians brought suit against Maui city
officials to declare Maui City Ordinance 308 Section 3(a)(4), as amended by
Maui C ounty Ordinance 697, unconstitutional because the ordinance violates
the First and Fourteenth Amendments {Ross v. Goshi 1972). Section 3(a)(4)
prohibits all outdoor political campaign signs (other than signs identifying the
headquarters of a political candidate) placed on real property, buildings, and
structures in view of the general public {Ross v. Goshi 1972). The stated purpose
of the section to limit the posting of signs was to “abate the traffic and fire
hazards caused by the proliferation of such signs and to preserve the natural
beauty of the county” (Ross v. Goshi 1972). The penalty for putting up a sign,
which was not permitted, was $500 per day until the sign was removed {Ross v.
Goshi 1972).
When it was originally passed in 1961, Section 3(a)(4) allowed political
signs that were no larger than eighteen square feet to be posted for sixty days
prior to and ten days following an election {Ross v. Goshi 1972).

The

amendment to the section was passed in 1971 and it had the effect of banning
all political campaign signs at all times {Ross v. Goshi 1972). Section 8 of Maui
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C ounty Ordinance, while prohibiting certain kinds of signs, including political
campaign signs, did allow for the display of various types of commercial signs
(Ross v. Goshi 1972). The distinction, according to the court, was that political
signs were prohibited and other signs were permitted simply due to the message
appearing on the face of the sign (Ross v. Goshi 1972).
Several cases have been decided in which certain reasonable regulations
placed on the posting of outdoor signs were deemed permissible when the
regulation was found to serve some “significant governmental interest” (Ross v.
Goshi 1972). A ny types of restrictions that come close to infringing upon First
Amendment freedoms are subject to careful scrutiny by the courts (Ross v. Goshi
1972).
Maui county officials needed to show that the restriction against posting
political campaign signs had some “rational relationship to the effectuation of
a proper governmental purpose,” and that it was necessary in order to promote
a “compelling state interest,” as was stated in the case of Peltz v. City o f South
Euclid (Ross v. Goshi 1972). There could be no compelling state interest in a
regulation when lesser means were available to achieve the same purpose (Ross
v. Goshi 1972).
In Ross, the defendants were unable to show that political signs that were
reasonable in “size, structure, appearance and placement” created a safety hazard
or tarnished the aesthetic beauty of Maui C ounty in a way that was different
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from the various types of commercial signs that were permitted (Ross v. Goshi
1972). The defendants relayed to the court that, as it was originally enacted,
Maui C ounty Ordinance 308 did warrant some sort of regulation because of the
multitude of signs permitted (Ross v. Goshi 1972). However, the court stated
that the amendment to the ordinance that prohibited all political campaign signs
was an overreaction, as a lesser measure could have been employed to regulate
the signs instead of getting rid of them altogether (Ross v. Goshi 1972). In Peltz
v. City o f South Euclid, the Ohio Supreme Court held that a “municipality is not
powerless” to create reasonable regulations against the nuisances that may be
caused by political signs, but that public officials may not take steps to prohibit
all campaign signs (Ross v. Goshi 1972).
The Ross court deemed that Maui County Ordinance 697 was unconstitu
tional in that it infringed on the plaintiffs’ constitutionally protected freedom
of speech and equal protection under the law (Ross v. Goshi 1972).

In

overturning ordinance 697, Section 3(a)(4) was left as it was originally enacted
where it allowed political signs of certain sizes to be posted for set durations of
time prior to and following an election (Ross v. Goshi 1972).

In deciding

whether or not the original ordinance was constitutional, the court found that
the restrictions imposed by the ordinance were a permissible form of balancing
the constitutional rights of the candidates against all other governmental
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interests (.Ross v. Goshi 1972). Thus, Maui County Ordinance 308 as originally
set forth was reinstituted (Ross v. Goshi 1972).
Three additional cases are w orthy of note for the fact that their election
sign limitation ordinances each proved to be in violation of the First Amend
ment.
In Van v. Oregon Travel Information Council, an Oregon statute that
prohibited the posting of signs at all times—except for a period of sixty days
prior to a general election—on land that was adjacent to federal highways was
found to be a violation of the First Amendment by the Oregon Court of
Appeals (Van v. Oregon Travel Information Council 1981).

The act, which

limited the erecting of temporary political signs, was promulgated by the
Oregon Travel Information Council (Van v. Oregon Travel Information Council
1981). The stated purpose of the act was to,
. . . promote the public safety, to preserve the recreational value of
public travel on state highways, and to preserve the natural beauty and
aesthetic features of such highways and adjacent areas (Van v. Oregon
Travel Information Council 1981).
The court found that the aesthetic interests seeking to be advanced by
the state through the passage of the ordinance were legitimate, but that it was
difficult to determine a relationship between the sixty-day limitation on the
posting of political signs, and matters relating to public safety—permitting
political signs on a temporary basis made it hard to imagine how prohibiting
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such signs at other times significantly promotes highway safety (Van v. Oregon
Travel Information Council 1981). According to the court,
Limiting the time period during which the political signs may be
maintained is more closely related to considerations of aesthetics and
preservation of the recreational value of Oregon’s highways, but these
interests, although valid, are not sufficient to justify this significant
restriction on political speech (Van v. Oregon Travel Information Council
1981).
The court went further to note that the entire process of acquainting the
public w ith new candidates is a slow one (Van v. Oregon Travel Information
Council 1981). Oregon’s election scheme inherently intensifies this process, as
its primary elections are held during the month of May, w ith the general
elections occurring in November, nearly six months later (Van v. Oregon Travel
Information Council 1981). Thus, the sixty-day political sign limitation was
even more unreasonable in hampering political speech (Van v. Oregon Travel
Information Council 1981).
Yet another such case that had the effect of infringing upon the
guarantees of political speech was Carollo v. Miami (Carollo v. Miami 1984). In
1984, the Florida Circuit Court struck down a Miami ordinance that required
a permit and the payment of a fee to post any temporary campaign sign that
measured over fifteen square feet on privately-owned commercial property
(Carollo v. Miami 1984).
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The plaintiff in this case, Carollo, was a candidate running for reelection
for his seat on the city commission (Carollo v. Miami 1984). Carollo posted an
estimated 75% of his 225 campaign signs on private property (Carollo v. Miami
1984). His signs measured 32 square feet (Carollo v. Miami 1984). Carollo did
not apply for or obtain a permit, nor did he pay any fees for the posting of his
signs (Carollo v. Miami 1984). He was able to secure a temporary restraining
order to prohibit the enforcement of the ordinance and challenged the
provisions of the ordinance that banned temporary campaign signs on private
property w ithout the required permit along with the payment of a minimum
fifteen dollar fee for all signs exceeding fifteen square feet in size (Carollo v.
Miami 1984).
According to the court, Miami’s temporary sign ordinance inhibited the
use of political signs by imposing permit and fee requirements (Carollo v. Miami
1984).

The court applied a balancing test pitting the First Amendment

guarantees against the legitimate governmental interest seeking to be furthered
(Carollo v. Miami 1984). The court noted that the same permit application form
was used for all signs, whether they were commercial, decorative, political, or
otherwise (Carollo v. Miami 1984). A permit application was to be filed and a
fee paid for each and every regulated sign, even if all the signs were identical
(Carollo v. Miami 1984). Carollo’s permit fees for his campaign signs would
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have amounted to $2,500, an unnecessary burden, according to the court
(Carollo v. Miami 1984).
The circuit court stated that the equal protection clause of the Four
teenth Amendment requires that any statute that affects First Amendment
freedoms be narrowly drawn to meet the state’s objectives, and not based on a
classification method that is discriminatory (Carollo v. Miami 1984). Section
2025.3 of the act allowed for the establishment of exemptions to the permit
requirements (Carollo v. Miami 1984). Signs displayed on vehicles, for example,
served to illustrate the ordinance’s discriminatory propensity (Carollo v. Miami
1984).

A political sign that exceeded two hundred square feet would be

permissible on privately-owned commercial property w ithout need of a permit
or permit fee if the sign were attached to a truck or another vehicle parked on
the property and if that vehicle could be used for normal transportation
purposes (Carollo v. Miami 1984).

The same two-hundred-square-foot sign

posted on the same commercial property w ithout having been mounted on a
vehicle would require the payment of an eighty-dollar permit fee (Carollo v.
Miami 1984).
The court concluded that the distinctions and classifications created by
such exemptions were both arbitrary and discriminatory because they favored
nonpolitical over political speech (Carollo v. Miami 1984). The city’s claim that
the ordinance was passed for means of aesthetics, safety, and the ensured
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removal of the signs after the election did not bear a “substantial relationship”
to the protection of such interests by imposing permits and fees (Carollo v.
Miami 1984). The court held that,
Miami has not sufficiently tailored its regulation of temporary campaign
signs to avoid arbitrary interference with the free exercise of fundamental
First Amendment rights (Carollo v. Miami 1984).
Finally, the case o f Arlington County Republican Committee v. Arlington
County involved a challenge to a zoning ordinance that restricted the placement
of political signs on private property to no more than tw o such signs (.Arlington
County Republican Committee v. Arlington County 1993). The plaintiffs argued
that the challenged provision violated their First Amendment guarantee of
freedom of speech as the two sign limit prevented both political parties and
individual homeowners from expressing their political views (Arlington County
Republican Committee v. Arlington County 1993).
The defendants expressed their belief that the ordinance furthered the
county’s substantial interest in promoting aesthetics and traffic safety (Arlington
County Republican Committee v. Arlington County 1993).

The Arlington

C ounty Republican Committee countered this viewpoint by providing evidence
showing the lack of any specific aesthetic or traffic safety problems during the
period of time in which a preliminary injunction prohibiting the enforcement
of the ordinance was in effect (Arlington County Republican Committee v.
Arlington County 1993). Thus, the political committee charged that the county
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failed to narrowly tailor its ordinance to further its stated interest (.Arlington
County Republican Committee v. Arlington Country 1993). The United States
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the Committee in that the twosign limitation was an infringement on political speech violating the First
Amendment, as it did not serve to further the state’s aesthetic and public safety
interests (Arlington County Republican Committee v. Arlington County 1993).

Sponsorship I dentification
Politicians seeking Federal office are subject to regulations that can
greatly differ from those that regulate state and local elections. The case of U.S.
v. Scott illustrated the importance of proper sponsorship information appearing
on campaign materials (U.S. v. Scott 1961).

The case involved the alleged

violation of a statute that prohibited the publication of a piece of campaign
literature for a candidate who sought the office of United States Senator, when
the name of the sponsor of the literature—in this case, a campaign brochure—
was not disclosed anywhere on the literature (U.S. v. Scott 1961). The defendant
argued that the sponsorship disclosure requirement infringed on his First
Amendment rights, and he moved for dismissal of the charges against him that
he violated Section 612 of Title 18 of the United States Code (U.S. v. Scott
1961).
Section 612 of the Code states that it is unlawful for an individual or
group to knowingly publish and distribute any campaign material on behalf of
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a candidate for Federal office w ithout declaring the name of the sponsor or
sponsors of the published piece (U.S. v. Scott 1961). The penalty for violating
the section is a fine of up to $1,000, a year in prison, or both (U.S. v. Scott
1961).
After senatorial candidate Q uentin Burdick had declared his intention to
seek the office of Senator from N orth Dakota prior to June of 1960, Scott,
during the m onth of June 1960, published and distributed copies of a pamphlet
concerning Q uentin Burdick titled, "Is this smear, or are they fact?" without
including any of the identities of the individuals responsible for producing the
pamphlet (U.S. v. Scott 1961).
The defendant stated that the charges brought against him violated his
First Amendment rights because, as a farmer, he was subject to a myriad of
Federal governmental regulatory interferences (U.S. v. Scott 1961). Scott stated
that each crop that he grew had certain guidelines that were set and determined
by Federal agencies and that, if he were to disclose his name on the campaign
literature, he would be subject to future retaliation by Federal officials (U.S. v.
Scott 1961).
Congress intended for the identities of the individuals producing
campaign literature to be disclosed so that the voters could be informed and
could make a decision about a particular candidate knowing by whom they had
been supported or opposed (US. v. Scott 1961). The N orth Dakota U.S. District
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C ourt stated that the defendant’s theory of potential future “reprisal is highly
speculative and conjectural” (U.S. v. Scott 1961). According to the court, the
mere possibility of retaliation is not sufficient enough to permit one from
following the prescribed sponsorship identification requirement (U.S. v. Scott
1961). The apparent value of Section 612 of the Code to the public outweighed
the alleged infringement of the defendant’s rights (U.S. v. Scott 1961). The court
held that Section 612 is a valid exercise of legislative power in the national
interest and that “scurrilous” publications by unknown authors are an “evil
which the Congress has seen fit to proscribe within the ambit of Section 612”
(U.S. v. Scott 1961).
The issue of sponsor identification on published political advertisements
was the focus of the case Kansas v. Davis.

The Kansas District C ourt in

Jefferson C ounty ruled, in September of 1991, which a Kansas statute that
proscribed criminal penalties against those who publish political advertisements
w ithout any form of sponsorship identification is overly-broad (Kansas v. Davis
1991).
The state held that the newspaper defendants published a display
advertisement for a third party—one who took a position on an upcoming jail
bond election—which was in violation of Kansas Statute 25-2407 because the
advertisement ran w ithout “attribution,” in that it contained no wording to
identify the sponsor of the advertisement (Kansas v. Davis 1991). Statute 25-
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2407 was referred to as Kansas’ “corrupt political advertising statute” (Kansas v.
Davis 1991). It stated, in essence, that when publishing or broadcasting a print
advertisement or a broadcast commercial that is intended to advocate one
political position over another, then the name of the chairman of the sponsoring
organization or political committee must be disclosed (.Kansas v. Davis 1991).
A violation of the statute constituted a misdemeanor (Kansas v. Davis 1991).
The newspaper defendants charged that the Kansas statute was unconsti
tutionally overbroad as it applied to “issue-oriented” speech, which is protected
by the First Amendment (Kansas v. Davis 1991). The court was in agreement
with the defendants and declared that the Kansas statute was unconstitutionally
overbroad (Kansas v. Davis 1991). The court stated that the statute’s attribution
requirement, as it related to candidate-oriented speech, was not a violation of the
First Amendment, but the goal of complete disclosure was not met by the
statute (Kansas v. Davis 1991). The court also held that while the anonymous
criticism of government is protected, the anonymous criticism of candidates for
public office may lead to an abuse of the electoral process (Kansas v. Davis
1991). This notion, in turn, leads to the necessity of “substantiating the state
interest” in order to justify a “limited impediment” on one’s First Amendment
rights (Kansas v. Davis 1991).
Along similar lines, the Supreme Judicial C ourt of Massachusetts, in June
of 1975, declared unconstitutional a criminal statute prohibiting any person
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from writing, printing, posting, or distributing election circulars or posters
unless there appeared “conspicuously” on the publications the names of the
officers of the organization that issued it, “or of some voter who is responsible
therefore” {Communications Law 1975). The court, in Commonwealth v. Dennis,
found the statute to either “impose . . . an unconstitutional prior restraint on
a nonvoter’s exercise of First Amendment rights” or, if construed to be
inapplicable to nonvoters, to establish an unconstitutionally irrational
distinction between voters and nonvoters {Communications Law 1975).

CHAPTER 4

Conclusion
The Microscopic View:
It has been said that the new FCC rules are “an effort to bring order and
chaos out of the FC C ’s existing political broadcasting enforcement, which has
evolved over the years and confounded FCC officials, broadcasters, and
candidates alike” (Jessell 34). Perhaps the jury is still out with regard to how
effective the new FCC political advertising reforms will be. In my opinion,
many of the complaints that were discussed earlier in Chapter Two are quite
valid.
In terms of the audio sponsorship identification requirement, the fact
that precious seconds are used up—often approximately 20% of a thirty-second
spot—makes one wonder if the FCC should be forcing candidates to buy the
thirty-second spots when they could be requiring stations to sell candidates
twenty-four-second spots instead. If the stipulation does, in fact, lead to the
virtual demise of the shorter ten- and fifteen-second spots for political
candidates, only those candidates with the war chests to purchase the longer-
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duration spots will be able to access this form of the media. The main intention
behind the video and audio sponsorship requirements was so that both hearingand visually-impaired voters could discover on whose behalf the political
advertisement was aired. However, if only the more wealthy candidates are the
ones who will be able to afford the longer spots, then all voters are put at a
disadvantage because they will not be afforded the exposure to as many of the
candidates as would otherwise be possible.
The argument expressed by the broadcasters regarding the responsibility
that they were given to make sure that political spots contain the proper
sponsorship identification is also justifiable. It should be the candidate or the
candidate’s campaign management team who is ultimately responsible for
improper sponsorship identification. However, the way the policy was enacted
requires that the station has the obligation to make sure that all political spots
conform to the FCC regulations and, if they do not, that the station is
responsible for making sure that the spots are repaired in order to meet the
prescribed format. The broadcaster is not expected to do the revisions free of
charge to the candidate, but if a spot were ever aired w ithout the proper
identification and it were discovered as such, the station would be liable and
would face possible sanctions by the FCC. The broadcaster is responsible for
making sure that hundreds of political spots meet the FCC regulations, and it
is not outside the realm of probability that one advertisement may get
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overlooked, especially in those situations when the candidate does not allow the
spot to be previewed by the station. A better approach would be to pass the
liability problem down to the candidate. This responsibility could be assumed
in the form of a waiver that the station should require the candidate to sign
attesting to the fact that the sponsorship identification requirement has been met
and, if it is learned that it has not, the candidate and not the station will assume
responsibility for any sanctions levied by the FCC.
O n a more positive side, the political file requirement that the broadcast
ers must fulfill is very admirable.

This provides complete candidate spot

scheduling disclosure to anyone requesting information at the station.

The

station is responsible for providing a log that lists each individual who requests
information on a given candidate, and exactly what information has been
requested. The station is allowed to make copies of the information for the
inquisitor. W ith such a log of those who have sought access to the files, both
the candidate and his opponents benefit.

The candidate can discover who

requested information on his advertising plans, and the opponents can use the
information to strategize exactly when and how much they choose to spend on
radio and television advertising. However, to be truly fair, it is essential that
the files and logs are maintained according to the established FCC requirements.
O f the cases discussed, the case of Gore Newspapers Company v. Shevin
was perhaps the most interesting, holding that candidates should not be given
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the lowest local advertising rate. Obviously, this perspective is long a thing of
the past as the FCC itself requires that the media provide political candidates
the lowest rates possible during the campaign period. The reasoning of the U.S.
District C ourt of Florida was interesting because, while it seems that the justices
were in agreement with the Florida legislature that these lesser rates should be
allowed, they reversed this train of thought and held the provision unconstitu
tional. Their seemingly weak rationale was based on the fact that the First
Amendment protects against a prior restraint by the government that, in this
case, dealt with the lessening of newspaper advertising revenues.
Overall, the cases discussed in this paper appear to be a sound
representation of the types of cases at the Federal and state level that have dealt
with political advertising. While it is clear that legislatures are not restricted
from placing regulations on issues that have an effect on political campaigns, it
is also equally clear that when these restrictions come particularly close to
infringing upon an individual’s First Amendment rights, the courts, as a whole,
will see fit to impose a rigorous test upon the restrictions to make certain that
the governmental interest allowed by the restriction is crucial enough to allow
these encroachments upon constitutional freedoms.
The cases that focused on regulations imposed upon the posting of
political signs, for instance, are good examples of the court system’s desire to
protect the citizens’ constitutional rights and to take into account the fact that
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local governments in particular may have a valid reason for trying to impose
posting regulations. The courts, in general, held that as long as the govern
m ent’s aesthetic and public safety reasons were found to be truly served by an
ordinance, then the regulation was found to be a permissible constitutional
limitation. Any slight infringement on the candidate’s ability to speak to the
voters, which would hamper the public’s right to be informed, was likely to be
deemed unconstitutional by the courts.
The new reforms proposed by the Federal Communications Commission
will have a definite effect upon political advertising in the years to come. Only
time will tell if, as the FCC had originally intended, the citizens prove to be the
real beneficiaries of this increased level of voter information. Indeed, today’s
political environment is not what it once was. Those candidates with high
ideals of changing the world for the better will not get very far if they do not
possess the ability to get their distinctive message to the voters. The use of
television and radio, especially in large markets and in statewide races, is
invaluable if the candidate wants a reasonable chance of attaining office.
However, the constitutional right to exercise one’s freedom of political speech
is not immune from encroachment by the regulatory agencies or the judiciary.
It seems, then, that we Americans are at the mercy of these varied entities to
assure that our rights are not usurped and are protected in the best manner
possible.
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The Macroscopic View:
If, for a moment, we take a step back from the intricacies of all the
enactments and regulations imposed on political advertising—taking a longer,
broader, more macroscopic view of both the intent and the demonstrated
practice of the process of political advertising—the immediate question that
arises is this: Have the many and various enactments and court decisions
actually been effective in “leveling the political playing field” by making it more
accessible to a wider spectrum of candidates?
It can be argued that they have not.
The political process is no more accessible simply because a candidate
w ith greater financial resources still has the ability to “overpower” the less
well-financed candidate in the advertising arena, and it is in this arena,
regrettably—an arena not of issues and clear debate, but one of advertising
power, manipulation, and acumen—that elections are so overwhelmingly often
decided.
A n example that illustrates this point: Candidate A and Candidate B are
running against one another for political office.

Candidate A is heavily-

financed, while Candidate B has considerably less money in her campaign
account. Both candidates will use various means of political advertising to get
what they hope to be their “distinctive” messages across to the voters.
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The regulations on political advertising will affect each candidate equally,
but because Candidate A has the funds to more effectively saturate the political
terrain with his message, he finds himself at a distinct advantage over Candidate
B. Regulations such as the lowest-unit-charge provision will do little to aid a
candidate who is unable to match another candidate’s spending levels. One
thousand gross rating points will beat one hundred gross rating points almost
every time.
Ironically, the lowest-unit-charge provision—instituted to assist candidates
such as Candidate B above—is actually a boon to Candidate A, the highlyfunded candidate. The provision lowers air time costs universally, allowing his
already abundant funds to go even further, to buy even more.
Furthermore, one should also never lose sight of the fact that the
legislative bodies—and the individual members of those bodies—who craft the
regulatory measures are quite mindful that, come reelection time, they, too, will
be bound by any new restrictions an d /o r regulations they enact.

In other

words, as they consider possible election reform laws and regulations, they are
well aware they are determining the rules they will themselves have to follow
to keep their jobs as elected legislators.

This is a situation in which the

incumbent can have a distinct advantage.
For example, an incumbent may find a double benefit in being a part of
limiting the extent and duration of political signage. O n the one hand, he can
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“grandstand” to his constituents about how he helped “rid our neighborhoods
of the ‘litter’ of political signs,” while on the other hand he knows that, as the
incumbent, he does not so badly need the simple awareness such signs provide
the electorate for a challenger.
A nother troubling point concerning political advertising is that executive
branch agencies, such as the FCC, regulate in a venue that is essentially closed
to the voter.

The average citizen cannot write to his or her “local” FCC

commissioner to urge him to support certain regulations over others because
there is no “local” FCC commissioner. In fact, no part of the FCC is directly
accountable to the voting public. If the average citizen communicates on such
matters at all, it will most likely be with his or her elected representatives.
Day-to-day enforcement—or lack of enforcement—of enacted political
advertising regulations takes place in an arena virtually inaccessible to those
whom it most profoundly affects. Only those individuals who are avid and
knowledgeable observers of the intricacies of the political process—an extremely
small proportion of the total electorate—will be privy to how legislation is being
regulated.
Perhaps the only real way the public can effectively voice their opinions
on matters that will truly affect how political advertising is regulated and,
therefore, is presented to them is, ironically, by exercising their right to vote.
The electorate must express its support for candidates who will not merely
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devise hollow legislation that provides candidates the opportunities to
“grandstand.” They must back candidates who seriously want to make the
electoral process an equitable one for all who wish to enter politics and serve
their constituents. That, ultimately, is not the responsibility of the FCC or of
Federal, state, or local politicians. It is the responsibility—and the choice—of
each individual voter.
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